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29 September 1982

WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 2037

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THEATER FORCES

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

EPPLER ON PEACE MOVEMENT, DISARMAMENT, MISSILES

Amsterdam ELSEVIER'S MAGAZINE in Dutch 28 Aug 82 pp 56-60

[Interview with Kirchentag President Dr Erhard Eppler by Rex Brico: "Politicians Do Not Understand the Peace Movement." Date not specified]

[Text] Dr Erhard Eppler, who is not only chairman of the Kirchentag and member of the synod of the Evangelical Church, but also a former minister and prominent SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] politician, plays an important role in the German peace movement. ELSEVIER visited him at his home in Dornstetten and discussed the movement with him, as well as the election advice of the IKV [Dutch Interchurch Peace Council], the negotiations in Geneva, the deterrence balance, the "new consciousness" and the role of the churches.

[Question] You are a prominent politician and a prominent Christian. How does it feel to be living in the friction area between those two areas, church and politics?

[Eppler] "I am experiencing that in two ways. On the one hand I can't simply do everything that is expected from me in my political work by my friends within the church. On the other hand, my experience is that any attempt to have Christian impulses function in politics, regardless of whether Christian Democrats or Social Democrats are concerned, meets with resistance. I found that to be the strongest during the 6 years I was responsible for the political policy of the German development cooperation. The warnings voiced by both of the large churches (Evangelical and Roman Catholic) were not taken seriously by any of the political parties, and consequently I often stood completely alone as minister."

[Question] What warnings, for example?

[Eppler] "To the churches, development aid is part of solidarity, but to a minister of trade it is part of foreign trade, to a minister of foreign affairs it is part of foreign policy, and to generals it is part of the security policy. It is extremely difficult for the minister of development cooperation to pursue projects which are exclusively aimed at the needs of the developing countries."

[Question] During your career you have often stood alone. And still now. How do you keep it up?

[Eppler] "When one has stopped thinking of his own career, one acquires a great deal of independence and also a great deal of resignedness when one stands alone. However, I have determined that I never stand alone for very long. With respect to the security policy, I stood almost completely alone in my party 3 years ago; now I believe that no party congress of the SPD will any longer take place which will still say yes -- not to the dual decision (of both negotiations and the placing of medium range missiles) -- but to the actual placing of missiles. And that is certainly a change."

[Question] Recently the peace movement in the Netherlands which represents the nine largest churches [the IKV] has advised people not to vote in favor of the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] or CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] in the coming elections because then there would be a chance the cruise missiles would be brought into one's territory. Many Christian Democrats see that as treason or as a negation of their maturity. What is your opinion?

[Eppler] "I would not want to limit that question to a Christian party, but would merely ask if it is legitimate for a church or religious institute to give election advice. In the Federal Republic we have the tradition of the religious memorandum. I myself have for 15 years been a member of the committee which composes those memoranda. During the past years those memoranda have taken a position with respect to matters such as the use of violence, the so-called extremist decision and, since 1965, our Eastern neighbors. That was a political matter of the first order. But the church has never stated: therefore you must vote on this or that party. It did say, however: We are submitting this for your consideration and are prepared to enter into a discussion on it with you. And that is the correct procedure in my view."

[Question] So you find what the IKV and Pax Christi [Catholic peace movement] have done to be incorrect?

[Eppler] "On principle I find religious election advice unjust, but this could be an exception. Actually, it is clear that the question of growing nuclear armament is not merely one of many political problems on which a Christian can make more than one decision. This is a question which concerns the survival of humanity and even of the creation. And it could very well be that a phenomenon is taking place here which occurs very rarely in politics, namely that of the /status confessionis/. A Christian then says: I owe it to my faith to speak up, for I shall be more guilty when I keep quiet than when I speak up. The question of nuclear arms -- and the Dutch churches have said so earlier and more clearly than the German ones -- has a theologic aspect. The election advice has to be seen in that light."

[Question] How exactly do you explain the mass resistance against nuclear arms which characterizes the German, American and Dutch peace movements?

[Eppler] "I think there are three reasons for that. First, there is the disappointment about the fact that the peace policy which was introduced 10 years

ago through treaties with the Soviet Union, Poland and the GDR has not been able to prevent a new round of armament from taking place. Further, there is the fact that the foundations of our security policy have become unstable. What exactly is meant by defense these days if that which one wants to defend can only be destroyed? What is understood by deterrence if strategists want to facilitate a nuclear war by introducing more precise missiles? What is understood by balance if everyone necessarily understands something different by it and agreement will never be reached on what it should mean in practice. What do negotiations mean if they merely serve as a smokescreen to let armament continue unhampered? Finally, I see the attitude of the American Government as a third cause for the resistance against nuclear arms. A government which cannot even tolerate an Alexander Haig in its ranks can only arouse distrust. And many Germans believe that it is not justified to grant such a government the power to have medium range missiles at its disposal on German soil."

[Question] In your book "Ways Out of Danger" you direct your hope to the "new consciousness" which is said to be increasing. What is the most essential element to you in that "new consciousness"?

[Eppler] "The new consciousness is characterized by an entirely different attitude toward technology, nature, achievement, time and, yes, also one's fellow creatures. It is a consciousness which no longer demands quantity but, rather, quality. A consciousness which doesn't demand achievement so much, but instead to a greater degree calls for the sense, the goal of the achievement. For me this new consciousness is a rebellion against what Erich Fromm called the necrophilic tendency in modern industrial society. It is a rebellion for life, an appeal to the living -- to quote Roger Garaudy."

[Question] Does that new consciousness also have something to do with a less defensive attitude and a greater vulnerability?

[Eppler] "It certainly does! I believe that the old thinking included an exaggerated concentration on security. I am astounded every time I hear that Ronald Reagan wants to close the "window of vulnerability." The image is monstrous already in itself, for being vulnerable is part of being human. The invulnerable human being would be a tyrant over all others; the invulnerable state would be master over all others. God knew very well why he made people and states vulnerable. And in our time we are experiencing the paradox that precisely the attempt to become invulnerable increases the danger of war."

[Question] How do you see that attempt to become invulnerable? As a symptom of degeneration of the West to which, for that matter, the Eastern bloc also belongs?

[Eppler] "No, rather that I believe it is the last miscarriage of technocratic thinking which, on the one hand, is completely without fantasy and, on the other hand, is so hardened within its own limitations that it should in reality be called necrophilic."

[Question] Don't you sometimes have the feeling that this new consciousness is better expressed politically by parties such as the Grunen [the "Greens," an anti-war, ecological party] in the FRG and the PPR [Political Party of Radicals] in the Netherlands than by the current social democrats in these countries?

[Eppler] "This new consciousness not only takes hold of marginal groups, but also of continually larger sectors of society. Only it happens in various degrees of intensity and at various speeds. This process of change is set up in a much too fundamental and broad manner to be able to channel it into a small party: it has all mass organizations in its grip. Therefore the most important controversies currently don't only take place between the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] and SPD, but also within the SPD; not only between evangelist and catholic, but primarily within these two faiths; no longer to a great degree between employers and employees, but within the trade unions and partly also within employers' organizations. I believe we must persevere. But precisely because I am convinced that this process affects the entire society, I count on it that some standpoints will acquire majorities within the SPD at the latest during the second half of the eighties."

[Question] If only that's not too late . . .

[Eppler] "I don't know if that's too late, it is possible . . ."

[Question] Your compatriot, the nuclear scientist C.F. von Weizsacker, would probably say it's too late . . .

[Eppler] "Yes, and that's why he had a fallout shelter built in his yard. I don't know, but in any event I don't act as if it is too late. No one has yet been able to prove to me that the new consciousness is coming too late. None of the large movements in history, whether it was the reformation or the labor movement, started at the top. They all grew from the grass roots and only later settled themselves in political institutions and persevered there, with or without revolution. And that's the way it will go this time also."

[Question] Then where in the grassroots of society do you see this new consciousness increasing? In the churches?

[Eppler] "Undoubtedly the strongest in the evangelical churches and in the SPD. Already at the federal conference in Berlin in 1979 we made a clear decision on the theme 'economy and ecology.' If we really were to carry out this decision, we would no longer need the Greens."

[Question] You and the German peace movement are repeatedly being accused of being idealistic and unrealistic. What exactly do you understand by realism?

[Eppler] "To me, realism is the attempt to analyze and understand reality before any action. What I accuse the current policy of, the government as well as the opposition, is that it is completely unrealistic for it doesn't understand a great part of reality at all. What I have heard from the mouth of the government and the opposition about the peace movement, whether it was friendly or meant as an abuse, has always been characterized by incomprehension of the

- central meaning of this movement. Our social-liberal coalition will probably have to pay for this lack of sense of reality with the loss of its parliamentary majority."

[Question] From your book "Ways out of Danger" I have understood that you don't expect anything from the negotiations in Geneva because the United States purportedly is more interested in stationing medium range missiles in Europe than in the Soviets removing their SS-20 missiles. Is that not a wicked accusation?

[Eppler] "I wrote that 20 months ago, and currently that is even more true than it was then. There is no progress at all in Geneva. And I cannot imagine either how a government which in all seriousness is trying to force the Soviet Union to its knees via boycotts could be willing to enter a reasonable agreement with respect to medium range missiles. At the moment I have the impression that the Reagan Government is arming and boycotting to bring the Soviet Union to its knees and is negotiating to keep the peace movements quiet."

[Question] Your chancellor and our prime minister answer that the Geneva negotiations would not yield anything if the United States were not able to manipulate the dual decision as a card up its sleeve.

[Eppler] "My answer to that is, first, that the Soviets offered to negotiate even before the dual decision was made and, second, that one cannot force a world power of this caliber to its knees. This problem can only be solved by making proposals which are acceptable to both parties."

[Question] Such as?

[Eppler] "If the Americans, for example, want to talk exclusively about medium range missiles and at the same time exclude their own forward based systems* as well as the French and British nuclear arms, then I cannot imagine how they hope to get any results. The Soviet Union has proposed that both sides reduce their numbers of delivery systems to 300. This would mean that the Americans would retain only 40 of those weapons in Europe because the remaining 260 are British and French weapons. In practice that means: the Soviets offer to disarm down to the point they merely have a counterbalance left against the British and French arms. And what do the Americans say? First we are not authorized to discuss British and French arms and, second, the British and French themselves are not prepared to discuss those arms. On the other hand, it is completely absurd to believe that the Soviet Union would dismantle everything while the British and French nuclear arms would have more nuclear warheads in a few years time than all the SS-20's together. Either solutions are found in which no one feels humiliated and cheated, or they are not found. But world powers don't care to be blackmailed."

[Question] What consequences would result for the FRG if the Dutch Government were to decide that it does not want those medium range missiles?

*American nuclear arms for the long distance, intended to defend Europe.

[Eppler] "It would result in a change of direction of the discussion in the FRG and in an increase in the chances of halting the nuclear arms race at a decisive point. My impression is that my Soviet discussion partners -- and I have competent discussion partners in this area -- have realized for a long time already that the Soviet Union has gone too far, both in the number of SS-20's and the speed with which it deployed those. Thus it knows it has to slow down. But at the same time I have the impression that the United States is not in the least interested in leaving a way out for the Soviets, but rather that with their new strategy they want arms with which they can destroy the command centers of the Soviets with 5 minutes warning time."

[Question] A "first strike capacity"?

[Eppler] "Not necessarily a 'first strike capacity,'* for then there would still remain a tremendous Soviet armed force. But possibly they are thinking of plunging the entire Soviet system into chaos. Such a threat would probably be lethal for Europe because the Soviets are already now capable of leaving their answer to such an attack up to computers. With a warning period of 5 minutes the Soviet Union would not have another choice either but to automatize the bringing about of a counter attack. And then the life of Europeans would depend on computers which, as we know, do not always work perfectly."

[Question] In all this, the peace movements have hardly any influence at all on governments. Although in Moscow demonstrations are not allowed, 700,000 people participated in New York, 400,000 in Amsterdam, etc., but the arms race simply continues.

[Eppler] "That will certainly change. At present that has to do with the fact that the change of consciousness we discussed takes place more rapidly in proportion to the extent the circles in which it takes place are farther removed from centers of political, economic and publicist power. That change takes place more slowly, however, in proportion to the degree one approaches those centers of power. But a time will come in which a German parliament also will amply and clearly be presented with that which is desired by the peace movement."

[Question] And the American congress?

[Eppler] "In the United States that time will come even more rapidly. I believe that the American peace movement is farther along than the European one."

[Question] But even a political detente, as was introduced 10 years ago, did not lead to disarmament, as you yourself noted just now.

[Eppler] "That is because disarmament taken on the basis of balance in itself is wrong. Such a formula sounds wise, but it does not work because no one will ever agree on what is a balance. In Vienna they have been arguing about that for 8 years already. Let's take the conventional forces, for example. In NATO calculations France is never included in those. But the Soviets of course do have to include France. In NATO calculations China is not included. But the Soviet Union has to

*The capacity to eliminate the enemy in a first strike.

include China. In NATO calculations the Soviet divisions in Czechoslovakia are attack troops, intended for southern Germany. But in the Soviet strategy those are possibly occupation troops to keep the Czechoslovaks under control."

[Question] And nuclear?

[Eppler] "As to nuclear [forces] it apparently is not possible to convert quality into quantity. At the moment the Soviets indeed have more strategic missiles than the Americans do. But the Americans have many more nuclear warheads on their missiles than the Soviets do. Then what is to be the measuring criterion? How can one resolve the extent of the number of nuclear warheads with their precision? That is always being done very arbitrarily and one never arrives at common criteria. Taking everything together, the game is so especially gruesome because one fourth of the current capacities would be sufficient to completely destroy the opponent. But the formula for disarmament on the basis of balance leads to each party arming itself to achieve that which he himself believes to be balance, to each party believing that what he himself does merely removes a disadvantageous imbalance, and to each seeing that what the other does as upsetting the balance to the other's advantage. And thus the concept of balance has itself become the motive force for further armament."

[Question] In conclusion, 30 years ago you and Herr Heinemann founded the Gesammtdeutsche Volkspartei [United German People's Party] after Moscow had offered to hold elections for one, undivided, neutral Germany. Don't you ever remember that time wistfully? Wouldn't that have been a blessing for Europe?

[Eppler] "Even today I am still convinced that acceptance of the Soviet proposal of 1952 would have increased the chances for peace in Europe, even though it would not have created a Europe without conflicts. However, that is history now, and I am not one of those who advocate the FRG's resignation from NATO within the near future. First of all, that would not be realistic and, moreover, it would not get us much further."

8700
CSO: 3105/207

TERRORISM

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

KLAR, THREE OTHERS ROB BANK IN BOCHUM

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 17 Sep 82 p 6

Article by "L.B.": "Christian Klar Takes Part in Bochum Bank Robbery"]

Text Bochum, 16 September--The Federal Prosecutor's office in Karslruhe has reliable information in hand indicating that four German terrorists belonging to the erstwhile "Red Army Fraction" (RAF) or one of its successor organizations--among them Christian Klar who has been sought for some time for a number of murders and attempts to kill--robbed a branch of the Bochum municipal savings association and made off with about DM 124,000. Information pointing to the terrorists did not harden until Thursday after BKA experts entered the case in Bochum. It was then that they found out that the getaway car contained Klar's fingerprints. In addition, the criminals --one man and three women--used wigs, gloves, scarfs and other items of clothing that are not normally worn in late summer to hide their identity. Similar items had been found over the past few years in so-called safe apartments located in various Rhine and Ruhr cities. A third indication for the fact that terrorists were responsible for the robbery was the use of a "duplicate" automobile which, police say, was something of an RAF trademark. The car bore the license plate HAM--YS 85 and the police would like to find out where else the car has been seen since 4 September.

The criminals entered the Bochum savings bank branch at 9.06 am last Wednesday. At that time, there were nine employees and three customers in the bank. Some other bank employees were still having breakfast in other rooms and one of the employees was working on monies deposited overnight. At first, witnesses said, they saw only three bank robbers whom they took to be women by the way they were dressed. One of them posted herself at the entrance with a machine pistol. The other two had someone open the door to the cashiers' cages after telling everyone: "Keep calm; this is a holdup." The door was propped open with a broomstick or mop to keep it from falling shut. The culprits ordered that all readily available money be placed in two gray cloth bags and also took several cash containers--called money bombs--with them.

The first getaway car was a gunmetal green Audi 100 that was parked across the street from the bank, eyewitnesses reported. There was a man at the wheel of this car. Police now assume it was Christian Klar. A short time later, the car was found abandoned at a bus stop a few hundred meters away. In the car, some of the items of clothing were found which the criminals had used to hide their identity. Another automobile of the same make and

color and bearing the same plates belongs to someone who licensed it in Hamm. But this particular car was standing in the owner's garage at the time of the robbery, as was quickly ascertained.

At first, BKA experts expressed surprise over the fact that German terrorists appear to be active in the Ruhr area once again although investigations were intensified some time ago in connection with events in Lebanon. There was no official confirmation of rumors saying that Klar and the women accompanying him had to quit their hideouts in Lebanon a short time back and that they urgently needed money to secure new underground quarters either in the FRG or in neighboring countries to the West. But there are signs pointing in this direction, which are being pursued. Judging by the fact that they took unusually high risks in Bochum, the terrorists must be experiencing financial difficulties, the Federal Prosecutor's office says.

9478
CSO: 3103/679

CDF CHIEF SAYS NO COAL FIELDS TO CLOSE IN CALAIS

Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Jun 82 p 41

[Article by Georges Sueur]

[Text] Lille--Like [Prime Minister Pierre] Mauroy at Lens last February, Valbon, president of CDF (Coal Fields of France), on a visit to Douai on 1 June was unable to provide a specific answer to the question: What is the future of the Nord-Pas de Calais coal fields?

Valbon was very careful not to bring up the goal set by his friends in the CGT (General Confederation of Workers): the production of 6 million tons of coal per year; or the goal of the CFDT (French Democratic Confederation of Labor): 4.5 million tons; or even the goal set 2 years ago by the regional council, with its leftist majority and headed by Mauroy: 5 million tons.

Valbon noted that the field had produced the most (29 million tons) in 1959 with 131,000 employees including 80,000 miners. In 1982, production fell to 3.8 million tons with about 25,000 employees, about half of whom were miners. The policy of retraining the miners carried out up to then no longer has any future. Valbon, accompanied by Michel Hug, the new director general, asserted "The mess resulting from the former policy is measured by the extent of the financial needs represented today by another policy: mining investments in 1980 amounted to but 16.3 million francs, less than .5 percent of the total business figure of 3.72 billion francs." That is why investments this year in mining equipment got a big push (47 million francs in authorized expenditures in 1982 have already been cleared, as opposed to 38 million in 1981). Hiring will be renewed, but at a slower pace: 1,000 workers in 1982, of whom 450 will be miners. "No coal fields will be closed in 1982," according to Valbon, "and the case of the Barre coal field will remain open even though it is a very difficult one..." Operation of the coal field is being heartily defended by the CGT and the PCF.

The remaining exploitable reserves are yet to be determined; a committee will work on it but it will take time. In the meanwhile, gasification experiments will continue (both Valbon and Hug have visited the new experimental site at Pont-a-Vendin in Haute-Deute). Along the same lines, the Mazingarde chemical

plant will get a coal gasification unit, either built on the spot or imported. The decision has been made to set up, at the same site, a materiel test plant (for which 26 million francs have already been made available).

It has been emphasized that it is not practical to concentrate only on [coal] extraction; thought must be given to the use and consumption of coal. "The Nord-Pas-de-Calais coal mining industry is strong from the mining phase right through to coke production, electricity generating and chemicals; these phases can and should be revived to play an important role...," said Valbon.

9974
CSO: 3100/771

BRIEFS

EXTRA SOVIET GAS PURCHASED--GDF (French [Natural] Gas Company) recently obtained an additional 1 billion cubic meters of Soviet natural gas. In contrast with earlier supplies of gas obtained from the USSR under long term purchase contracts, this purchase was effected on the spot market and was, thus, not related to them. Favorable financial conditions appear to have been behind this transaction which was carried out through a Swiss intermediary. The transaction between Soyuzgas Export of the USSR and GDF was reportedly carried out at the end of 1981 or early in 1982, or about the same time as the [conclusion of the] contract for 8 billion cubic meters over a period of 25 years, a contract which raised some eyebrows in view of the ongoing events in Poland. The purchase of this additional billion cubic meters is also demonstrative of the progressive establishment of a spot market for natural gas similar to the spot market for petroleum. Actually, the Soviets had hoped to sell 2 billion cubic meters and had also approached Ruhrgas of the FRG, but nothing came of it. As for GDF, it was satisfied with 1 billion cubic meters, in view of the existing situation, characterized by an 0.5 percent drop in French consumption during the first 4 months of this year, by the quantity of gas stockpiled and, finally, by the conclusion of the recent Algerian [gas] contract. This combination of factors, moreover, led the EDF [sic: GDF] to reduce its purchases of Dutch gas to the minimum specified by the contract. This gas surplus situation also explains why GDF rented storage facilities in Austria. It looks more and more, as matters stand, as though France did not have to subject itself to Algeria's conditions, even though the political situation did not favor the Soviet alternative which, ultimately, was ignored. [Text] [Paris LES ECHOS in French 11 Jun 82 p 5] 9974

CSO: 3100/771

REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE ENERGY POLICY EYED

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 2 Aug 82 pp 1, 4

[Article by Erhan Isil: "Effective, Consistent Energy Policy Must Be Formulated"]

[Text] Our world does, indeed, have an energy problem. The same goes for our country. Nations the world over whose industrial revolutions began centuries ago knew how important energy was. The non-industrialized states, however, had no better grasp of energy than they did of many other things. A poignant example is seen in the comments written in his diary by Sadrazam Said Pasha. When the British were claiming rights in our province of Kuwait, the Pasha wrote in his diary, "I cannot understand what business these British have in our Kuwait Province." This was a situation that poor Said Pasha and numerous other Said Pashas would never comprehend as long as they lived. They could not understand that industrialized nations need a continuous source of cheap energy. They were equally as unable to see the imperialist states' appetite for exploitable economic potential. Nevertheless, energy wars, especially over petroleum, were fought in many areas of our world, ostensibly for other reasons. For example, Turkish troops and soldiers of the British Empire fought for years in the present-day Arab nations. Young men in the hundreds of thousands on both sides gave their lives, unaware that they were fighting over oil. Such wars took place in greater or lesser intensity all over Asia and Africa. And this is still the case today. The bloody battle between Iran and Iraq is essentially rooted in the energy problem. In other words, a war is being fought in the northern Persian Gulf for the oil that supplies 54 percent of the industrialized world's total energy needs. The alarming thing about it is that the energy war seems eternal.

Many people think the energy problem in Turkey came about in the past 10 years. But the problem existed even under Ottoman rule. The Anatolian peasant burning dried dung has the epitome of an energy problem. The manure which should be used to fertilize the soil to improve agricultural production has been burned for centuries to keep people warm. And this is because alternative energy sources to provide heat have not been developed. Wood is in the same position. Owing to inadequate coal production, our people whether rural or urban have burned wood, devastating our forests. This is true even today.

The cause is the failure to formulate an energy policy. One result of this lack of policy in Turkey is that up to 54 percent of our total energy needs depend on oil and another is the very risky business of a steadily growing energy deficit.

In fact, many deficits in our country such as educational deficiencies, lack of technical personnel and a shortage of scientists are showing a gradually diminishing trend, but the energy deficit grows every year. And that means we have to say good-bye to any hopes of rapid development.

Various factors accompanying the absence of a scientific energy policy, and some of which are caused by it, contribute to the energy deficit and its growth. Let us look at these factors briefly, though not in any priority order.

1. Energy goals in development plans have always been lower than they should. That is, the energy needs, including coal and oil, required by population growth, industrialization and rapid urbanization in Turkey have not been accurately projected. For example, 11 percent to 12 percent increases in electrical energy were considered adequate for years, but, seeing that the country would still be in darkness, the so-called solution to the problem was to order units which produce energy by burning petroleum, such as the Ambarli fuel-oil plant, from foreign countries. It was the Ambarli plant that for years provided, by itself, 40 percent of Turkey's total electrical energy output. Everything about this situation was in defiance of the priorities of military security, economic development and utilization of energy resources. One serious mistake after another was made in the name of correcting the situation. Just consider for a moment that this powerplant, running at full capacity, sent up its smokestack everyday 118 million Turkish liras' worth of petroleum.

Another byproduct of the lack of policy appeared in village electrification. The needs of rural areas were barely considered in setting electricity production goals. However, once the villages began to exercise their political clout, they forced widespread village electrification. This effort, conducted at the personal political level in a climate of "the squeaky hinge gets the oil," inevitably became one with high energy losses and low productivity. If it had not been put on such an undignified level as making an issue of the self-respect of village residents in the first place, village electrification could have been carried out in conformity with technical and economic needs.

2. One factor contributing to the rapid growth of the energy deficit was the excessive subsidy of energy resources. In particular, the years of insisting on selling petroleum products below cost led to wasteful consumption of liquid fuel. The many prominent politicians who bragged about selling gasoline below cost and could not see how wrong it was were living symbols of this sad period of extravagant waste.

When the liquid fuel subsidy was lifted early in 1980, oil consumption which had been growing at 12 percent-14 percent annually in recent years fell or held steady. The same was true for electricity and coal. When electric rates rose and the price of coal went up, conservation began.

3. A great many technocrats and politicians were unable to understand the oil shock of 1974 and the energy crisis which followed. Almost every country, whether industrialized or developing, took countless energy conservation measures, while in Turkey, very little effort was made. Domestic petroleum exploration and production were neither conducted as they should have been nor was

the effort made for the necessary development of such energy resources as coal, solar and electric. Moreover, although the first order of business for almost every state was energy conservation or the wise use of energy, we had no more than four or five people concerned with the topic for years. Yet if we had chosen the route of rapid development of energy resources and energy conservation, Turkey would not have suffered a blow to its economic development and the foreign exchange squeeze would not have been so bad.

4. I have said that energy (production) goals have been too low or inadequate for 30 years for Turkey's development--economic and social development. The negative results of this situation are obvious. And something else which makes them even more negative is that energy investments can be completed only after years of delay.

A typical example of this is the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth electricity generators at Keban Dam. As will be recalled, the first, second, third and fourth units (turbines and generators) at Keban Dam went into operation in the late summer of 1974, but the orders had not even been placed for the fifth through eighth turbine-generators. It was an alarming situation. The dam was built in 10 years, the eight conduits had been completed, but turbine-generators were installed at only four of them. The second four units would produce an additional 2.5 billion kilowatt hours of electricity annually. The energy minister of the time gave instructions for the fifth-eighth units to be ordered immediately in November 1974. Everything was ready--to wait until 1982 for the four turbine-generators to be installed at this dam and start producing electricity. With this kind of work tempo, it is useless to ask why electricity rationing is not applied in our country.

5. Another factor making our energy problem worse is administrative feudalism. Our planning organization, financial administration, customs authorities, Ministry of Industry and other public bodies have overlapping jurisdictions and all make energy-related regulations. The Atomic Energy Commission insists that it is subordinate to the Prime Ministry and out of reach of the Ministry of Energy and, naturally, there is duplication, squabbling and lack of coordination where nuclear energy is concerned. The Mining Research Institute and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation have fought for years over who should be responsible for petroleum exploration. The state organizations turning out petroleum products are incredibly lackadaisical, refusing to sell fuel oil to the state organizations producing electricity and offering the rationale, "What if they don't pay for it?" The Electric Affairs Study Administration, which has served as an example to numerous countries since the 1930's and, in fact, has been of great service to Turkey, was put out of work by the laws founding the State Planning Organization, the State Hydraulic Affairs Directorate General and the Turkish Electric Power Enterprise and the way in which they are organized. No law has been written defining the functions and organization of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. The interesting aspect of the matter is that they are happy about the absence of such a law because it gives them more latitude. The administrators of the energy-related organizations take delight in their skill at foiling each other rather than working together on energy. There are three large public enterprises doing the job of one in selling liquid fuel and no one seems to have the power to bring this nonsense to an end.

There is no need to go on with further examples. What is needed is the elimination of this administrative feudalism and the introduction of some rationality.

There is another side of the oil coin which bears mention.

Our republic established the Mining Research Institute in 1935. This organization extracted petroleum at Mount Raman in 1940. And Raman is still today our most productive oil area.

In 1954, the government of the time had somebody named Max Ball prepare a draft law on petroleum. This bill granted incredible rights and powers to foreign oil companies. If the government wanted to change a provision of the petroleum law, for instance, it would have to get written permission from the foreign oil companies. This bill was considerably watered down by the parliament of that time in general and the late Inonu and the RPP which he headed in particular. Nevertheless, a series of changes were occurring outside Turkey at that time. By then, it could no longer be said with confidence that Turkey was very rich in oil, and Saudi Arabia's low cost had rightly put this nation in the top position. In fact, a barrel of oil which cost 55 cents in Venezuela, 70 cents in the Soviet Union and 70 cents in the United States cost only 10 cents in Saudi Arabia and was very plentiful besides. A similar situation existed in the other oil-rich countries of the Middle East. Turkey had naturally become a country of second, third or fourth interest where oil was concerned. Foreign oil costs rose proportionately by 1974. With crude oil prices quadrupling in 1974, oil extraction became rather profitable once again in our country. But Fund 20, a fund placed into effect at that time, made it compulsory to transfer these profits directly to the Treasury. In that this feature of the fund was its only purpose, oil exploration and production was being punished. Naturally, the state's oil exploration-production organization was the one punished the worst. So this was another painful result of the lack of policy.

"Does Turkey have oil or not?" The debate has gone on for years. The question is phrased wrong, because Turkey has been pumping oil out of the ground for 42 years. Where the great uncertainty lies is in answer to whether the oil is plentiful or not. Available official studies indicate generally that Turkey could be producing a great deal more crude oil than it does at present. This is a rather theoretical evaluation, however. If the petroleum-related organizations continue to insist on wasting time on risky investments and trading in oil instead of exploring for oil and persist in their stingy personnel regimes that only allow the loss of their best geologists, geophysicists and petroleum and chemical engineers to foreign countries, it would be better to just forget about this assessment.

So far, we have explained some of the energy-related shortcomings and mistakes. It is not enough, however, just to observe and criticize. What must be done? When we explain that, we will have done something useful.

The first thing that has to be done is formulate a scientific energy policy that is effective and consistent for our country. Unless this is done, it will be impossible to prevent depletion of manpower and financial resources or obtain a vigorous and economic supply of energy. This energy policy, naturally, will

take as fundamental our national goal which the Great Ataturk defined as achieving the level of modern civilization. In other words, the goal in formulation of the energy policy will certainly be economic and political independence, rapid industrialization and rapid urbanization, modernization of agriculture, industry and services, improvement of resource utilization and, most important of all, raising our country's educational level and standard of living.

Until such a policy is formulated, thought may be given to various areas which would contribute in part to the formulation of it. Let us look at them now.

1. It would be rather difficult for the applicable scientific research to be done at the ministries and other public organizations. The Energy Ministry, too, is no exception to this rule. What is needed is a scientific body, unhampered by administrative duties, that would cooperate with the universities in Turkey, exchange ideas, keep up with the world's energy-related scientific and technological advances, lay the groundwork for technology transfers and prepare policies and programs, and adjustments to them, for presentation to the ministries and the government. Such a body, as customary in our country, could be called an institute. Actually, a slight legal modification could turn the presently non-functioning Electrical Affairs Study Administration into the proposed "Turkish Energy Institute." The institute's impact on energy topics when it became functional and the benefits to be derived would be astounding. Let me give an example of what I expect here. It is possible to convert sunlight directly into electrical energy. These systems, called photovoltaic cell systems, are not commercially (economically) viable for today, but they soon will be. So, in order not to be left so far behind at that time, there is a need for a publically-funded organization whose job would be to conduct the necessary applicable research.

2. It is necessary that there be a special program for oil exploration and that the various authorities adhere to it. Pawning off a matter of as vital importance as oil exploration and production on foreign oil companies is not policy. Turkey is obligated to study its lessons on this subject.

3. Among the new sources of energy, wind and ocean thermal energy are ones which do not seem very promising for Turkey. On the other hand, solar energy and biogas can make significant contributions to closing our energy gap. When planned in conjunction with heat pumps, solar energy can replace coal and liquid fuels extensively in home heating. A similar situation holds true for biogas derived from animal wastes, because millions of large and small livestock are raised in our country. Biogas can be used for home lighting, cooking and heating in rural areas. If both solar and biogas energy were reinforced by measures such as signature loans and tax credits, sizeable foreign exchange benefits would accrue in addition to the energy.

4. Saving energy, energy conservation and the thrifty use of energy all mean the same thing. The point that bears immediate explanation is that they do not mean the use of less energy. In other words, energy conservation means doing more work with a given amount of energy or doing a particular job with less energy. There are many measures that could be taken in Turkey with this understanding but only a limited number of measures has been adopted and only some of those have been enforced.

What are these measures? Let us consider a few of them. If ceilings were insulated in buildings heated by liquid fuel, \$150 million less in oil would be consumed annually. If windows were double glazed, about the same amount of oil would be saved. If speed limits were enforced on the highways, there would both be a savings of 280 million Turkish liras in fuel and 5,000 people would not die on the highways annually (this being in itself the greatest of benefits). If buses were used for interior mass transit instead of the 63,000 minibuses and 15,000 shared taxis, another oil savings in the tens of billions of liras would accrue. If the use of railroads and sea routes were increased for freight and passenger transport instead of pushing the expansion of highway transport, it would prevent the expenditure of billions of liras in foreign exchange. If long-distance communications were developed, less travel would be needed and less energy expended. If electric rates were revised to encourage less rather than more consumption, electricity would be used prudently. If petroleum products were conveyed, for example between Ankara and Izmit, by pipeline rather than highway tankers, tremendous savings would occur in the type of liquid fuel alone. Even such methods as reducing industrial heat loss and recycling the wasted warm air can create enormous energy savings. My purpose in naming these is to show that the energy problem in Turkey is not something engraved in stone that cannot be changed in a short time. In other words, if Turkey used energy intelligently it could greatly ameliorate this problem.

5. Preventing delays in energy investments or at least reducing them a great deal is not so great a problem as thought. Delays could be reduced to insignificant levels if technical, administrative, financial and legal effectiveness and relevance were ensured at many stages from project preparation and the drawing up of specifications to preliminary or final adoption. The matter of administrative effectiveness and relevance is directed not so much at the public organizations that make the investments as at the relationships with those organizations of the ministries and bodies concerned as to duties and powers. That is, the matter goes full circle and comes back to administrative feudalism. The root solution is administrative reform.

I would not wish to conclude this article without mentioning two other points of importance. First is the hydroelectric potential of the numerous small streams, particularly in Anatolia. It is possible in Turkey to build small powerplants on these streams which would require personnel only intermittently for maintenance. They would reduce the burden on the national (interconnected) electric power grid, making it more reliable. I do not think this has been given the attention it deserves.

The second point is the apparent difficulty in coordinating investments in energy transmission lines and the production of electrical energy. Perhaps in a few years Turkey will be producing all the electrical energy it can at a level to prevent shortages, but the transmission system to convey this electricity to the areas where it will be consumed will not be completed. The Turkish Electric Power Enterprise has spoken of the danger of this but has been unable to get the cooperation of other public establishments. It must be helped rather than hindered in its investments in the inconspicuous energy transmission lines that avoid the possibilities of breaks.

8349
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CONSERVATION, ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES ASSAYED

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 3 Aug 82 p 2

[Article by Celal Yavuz Ozcelik: "Energy: Conservation and Alternatives"]

[Text] Energy is steadily assuming more importance both in economic development and individual consumption. Energy demands are increasing owing on the one hand to intensified investments and industrial development and, on the other, to differentiation in the patterns of individual consumption as a result of a rising standard of living.

Oil, coal and electricity may be considered the most widely used energy sources today. Doubtless, serious efforts have been made in recent years to develop nuclear energy and solar energy as power sources, but we cannot say at the moment they constitute serious alternatives to the types of energy we first mentioned.

This means that the economic prosperity of a country depends on how much coal, petroleum and electricity it consumes. Naturally, nations unable to produce these types of energy themselves or unable to procure them abroad fall behind in economic development and the consumption standards dependent upon it. As known, this was the problem in one aspect of the crisis which overtook Turkey in the latter half of the 1970's. Any nation wishing to consume more than it produces but lacking adequate resources to import the difference would naturally take the route of energy conservation to alleviate the problem in the short term. Indeed, various campaigns were launched and legal adjustments made in Turkey along this route in an effort to reduce the energy consumed both by the people and the industrial sector.

However, one point must be clarified here. Actually, energy consumption in Turkey is already quite low compared to Western nations. So even if these nations make serious cut-backs in energy consumption, their energy consumption will still be several times over Turkey's. For example, per capita electricity consumption in Turkey in 1979 was 546 kilowatt hours. It was three times higher in Greece and five times higher in Bulgaria. Likewise, while per capita energy production in Turkey was 500 kilowatt hours, it was around 4,000-5,000 kilowatt hours in Europe and 2,000-3,000 kilowatt hours in the Balkans.

As seen, Turkey is not essentially a high-consumer nation. In this case, the demand that even less be consumed may be seen as unfair. Moreover, in a climate

in which energy is this expensive, it might be suggested that the people could not consume it unnecessarily anyway. However, considering that a society's opportunities for consumption are defined by its production power and that an economy wishing to consume more than it produces will inevitably have a deficit, we must admit that there is no other way.

This means that energy conservation is unavoidable over the short term in countries like Turkey. However, it is the state must take on the task of providing serious leadership for the public in this regard. Why does a state encouraging its people to turn off unnecessary lights continue to burn street lights in the day time? Why can the same state not prevent the loss of the savings achieved by thousands of individuals turning off their lights caused by the use of poor-quality equipment in its electric powerplants, transmission units and substations as well as by sloppiness and lack of direction? Moreover, why can it not do something about the production of poor-quality electrical equipment which causes a dam to lose almost as much energy as it produces each year?

An economic policy is credible and able to win public support only if it is applied uniformly and seriously. This is why it is necessary for the state, which in Turkey is the biggest producer, distributor and consumer of energy, to place priority upon a review of its own practices and concept of conservation.

Actually, one of the most important causes of the energy bottleneck being experienced in Turkey today is the error of policies applied to date. When we examine distribution to the country's energy-consuming sectors, it can be plainly seen that it is a deficient structure. Let us examine the table below showing the distribution of total energy among the consuming sectors in our country:

<u>Sectors</u>	<u>%</u>
Agriculture	6
Power plants	16
Homes	35
Communications, transportation	15
Industry	28

As seen, the industrial sector consumes less of Turkey's energy than homes. Yet industrial energy consumption is an important indicator of economic development. Likewise, the communications sector and power plants take large shares of the energy consumed. These figures show that the energy policy applied up to the present time contained significant mistakes.

Actually, energy conservation, as we said above, is meaningful only as a short-term policy. While conservation is in progress, methods must be adopted to increase energy production in the long run and to produce abundant and cheap energy adequate for our own needs. And this requires quick energy investments.

It is also known, however, that energy investments have very high costs and take a long time to be of benefit to the economy. In this case, each country must study its own circumstances and move into production of the type of energy that it can produce the cheapest.

A study of Turkey's physical structure reveals that it is a country blessed with hydro resources. As to hydro resources convertible into electricity, our country is third in Europe after the Soviet Union and Norway, and this shows the need to stress seriously hydroelectric production.

Energy produced by water has gained importance in our time because of the great increase in costs of other types of energy. Moreover, the serious environmental problems created by the other types of energy make hydroelectric energy even more advantageous.

Despite all this, Turkey was able to exploit only 11 percent of its hydroelectric potential in 1980. Even so, this amount accounts for 48.7 percent of the electrical energy produced in the country.

Another alternative much discussed in recent years is solar energy. Turkey's climate has significant advantages for this type of energy. Research shows that Turkey's annual solar energy potential is equal to 36 million tons of coal. Considering that the country's average annual coal production is around 4 million tons, the importance of this ratio is clear. For some reason, however, this type of energy is not being given anywhere near the attention it deserves.

Yet solar energy is clearly superior in many ways as it is inexhaustible, creates no environmental problems and can be put to work at low cost. For this reason, the state must take on the task of leadership and urge the public to use this type of energy. Incentives such as tax credits and low-interest loans are being applied in various West European countries today to encourage the use of solar energy in industry. Similar practices would be beneficial in Turkey also.

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BRIEFS

EXPANSION OF IZMIR REFINERY--The new installations which will increase the annual capacity of the Izmir refinery from 3.8 million tons to 4.8 million tons were commissioned today. The regional director of the Izmir refinery, Ozkan Mentes said that this increase in the capacity of the refinery will make an additional contribution of some \$28 million annually to the national economy. He added that the construction of the new installations cost some 9.18 billion liras. The new installations include a water cooling unit, a flame system, storage tanks, a carbon monoxide boiler and an asphalt production unit. [TA101915 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1400 GMT 10 SEP 82]

CSO: 4654/449

AKAT INTERVIEWED ON STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN ECONOMY

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 25 Jul 82 pp 6,9

[Interview with Economics Professor Asaf Savas Akat by CUMHURIYET correspondent Osman Ulagay; date and place not given]

[Text] Who Is Asaf Savas Akat?

Asaf Savas Akat was born in 1943. He is a graduate of Galatasaray Lycée and the School of Economics of the University of Istanbul. He completed his graduate work at the University of East Anglia and the London School of Economics in England. In 1973, Akat became an assistant professor, and, in 1980, he became a full professor. Professor Akat has several papers published in various journals and is the author of the book "Economic Analysis."

Question: At a time when the restructuring of the Turkish economy is once again an item on the political agenda, a debate is under way on whether to continue implementing [former Deputy Prime Minister Turgut] Ozal's economic model with slight variations, or to change that model fundamentally. Honorable Akat, the first question I want to ask is this: How far can the new team which will chart the course of the economy from here on move away from the model and methods used by Ozal?

Answer: At this time, we do not have any detailed information about the economic policy the new team will pursue. We have read in the press that a number of programs and proposals have been discussed, but we do not know what the final form of these proposals will be. However, from what we understand, it appears that the general outlines of the 24 January [1980] decisions will remain in place. This is not surprising because, in an economy like that of Turkey, the general outline of the policy to be pursued is more or less well-known.

Question: Can a new approach be expected in the details of the policy?

Answer: There can be significant differences in the details. But we do not yet know whether we will see concrete policies significantly different from what has been implemented so far. However, one point must be understood very well: Turkey has wasted the past two years or so, and, no matter how we look at it, the team that is taking over does not have a promising future.

Question: I think that the team taking over from Ozal will have two major problems. Firstly, as you pointed out, there is the urgent need to resolve the problems that have piled up over the past 2 years, and secondly, linked with the first problem, there is the issue of rising expectations in various sectors of our society. Do you not think that, in an environment where everyone wants his problem to be solved first, such expectations will limit the options before the new team?

Answer: Definitely. Since a new constitution is in the works, and elections may follow suit, we can even expect an election economy in Turkey. Such an eventuality would, naturally, cause problems. All sectors of the society are tired of promises of "turning the corner" made by Ozal and those who have been charting the course of the economy for the past 6 or 7 years. They want an end to their problems. These factors, combined with the unhappy legacy of the past 2 years, have produced an explosive mixture.

Question: Toward what new policies can this "explosive mixture" force the new team?

Answer: At this point, it is hard to say anything, but we can overview the main points. The first issue to look at is the "tight money" policy. I do not foresee a sudden growth in the money supply, because, at this point, the administration does not have such an option in its hands. Even a slight growth in money supply can cause a surge in inflation in view of the expectations we just talked about. Furthermore, any growth in the money supply can lead to a rapid deterioration of the balance of payments situation. The new team will, therefore, have its hands tied down in this issue as a result of these two reasons.

Question: What can happen in the finance sector, where problems have reached an explosive stage?

Answer: I have been reiterating for a long time that the finance sector is the sickest segment of the Turkish economy. If the new team tries to lower or fix interest rates, it will aggravate the problem of declining savings in an economy suffering from insufficient savings and liquidity.

Question: In other words, in this area, too, the new team has very limited options.

Answer: As I have stated on several previous occasions, the financing sector has a structural problem and, consequently, must be nationalized. I do not think that a solution can be found in this area by using Central Bank funds to rescue certain banks or by returning to the exploitation of savers by low interest rates.

Question: What about options in other areas?

Answer: One area that comes to mind is the export sector. Here, too, we have gone over the peak. A high growth rate in national income is necessary to maintain a strong pace in exports. Consequently, given the present structure of the economy, the options in this area are also limited.

Question: It would probably be difficult to move away from the currency exchange policy presently being implemented with respect to exports.

Answer: We know what would happen if the present currency exchange policy is changed, and the Turkish currency becomes overvalued as it was in the past. Such a move would increase imports and reduce exports. If such a move is accompanied by fixed interest rates, the flight of capital abroad would accelerate, and the demand for gold would rise. In other words, here, too, there is not much space for maneuvering.

Question: In the light of what we have discussed so far, what are your thoughts about rumors to the effect that there will be a shift from Ozal's "Friedmanist" policies to Kafaoglu's "Keynesian" methods? Also, what do these two terms mean?

Answer: It appears that we are too fond of labels in economics, and it seems to me that we are using terms like "Friedmanism" and "Keynesianism" all too often. To me, the questions of when and how Friedmanism or Keynesianism have been implemented in Turkey are highly debatable issues. As for the meaning of these terms, I can say this: In general, macroeconomic policies which suppress demand are Friedmanist and those which stimulate the market are Keynesian.

Question: Is this debate important from Turkey's perspective at this point in time?

Answer: In my view, Turkey's problem is not this at all. Instead of debating this issue the following question must be posed: Can any of these guessing policies do anything for Turkey? In my view, they cannot. At this point, there is no benefit Turkey can gain by expanding or contracting the money supply. In other words, Turkey's economic problems cannot be solved by money presses. Neither working the money presses 24 hours a day nor shutting them down altogether will solve Turkey's economic problems. At this point, overworking the presses and shutting them down will both produce grave results. Turkey's present problems were piled up over the last 30 years. The days of high growth without making sacrifices, without increasing domestic savings, without earning hard currencies and without paying attention to the efficient utilization of resources are over for Turkey. At this point, recessionist or expansionist, Friedmanist or Keynesian policies will produce identical results. Both policies are condemned to failure if they are implemented before the economy is put back on its tracks.

Question: In other words, you do not think the debate about these theoretical policies is very meaningful.

Answer: In my opinion, a debate about theoretical policies must take place only when a fundamental economic policy, which will be aimed at high growth and which will address the issues of employment and distribution of wealth, has been put in place. At this point, we see no indications as to whether the new economic team will have the courage to attack these problem areas, whether it will risk hurting certain parties and whether it will have the political will to do what is necessary.

Question: The issue of structural changes in the economy has been a common subject of discussion in the past 2 years. The Honorable Ozal also talked frequently about this issue and, apparently, hoped that market forces would take care of it.

Answer: Let me first say this: There has not been the slightest change in Turkey's economy in the past 2 years. The myth of "structural change," just like the myth of "there are no other alternatives," has been nothing but empty words.

Question: What grounds do you have for that conclusion?

Answer: What has changed in the past 2 years? The protectionist policies currently being implemented are what they were 2 years or even 10 years ago. Turkey's banking system is now controlled by the same families who had control over the banks 4 years ago. Where is the structural change here? On the issue of taxes, only the tax schedules have been changed; the rest is the same as before. The current tax structure is what we had in the 1950's. In currency exchange, the exchange rate is being set every day at a time when exchange rates around the world are already changing very rapidly. Interest rates appear to have been freed, but they are held at a certain level by a trust system. None of these can be termed as a serious structural change.

Question: What, in your opinion, should a structural change program embody and how should this program be implemented?

Answer: First of all, high growth must be set as the primary goal, and it must be understood that Turkey's economic problems cannot be solved in the absence of a high economic growth rate. However, this goal is not sufficient by itself; it must be supported by two additional important goals. The second most important goal, in my opinion, is the resolution of the employment issue. The strategies selected must be such that they will increase employment at a high rate. The third goal must be the rectification of the wealth distribution situation.

Question: What are the problems that can be encountered in trying to achieve these goals?

Answer: The main problem is the inadequate level of domestic savings in Turkey. For the past 30 years, Turkey has tried to industrialize without asking for the necessary sacrifices from those who can afford to make sacrifices. In Turkey, savings constitute 15 percent of the national income. Even in India, which is six times poorer than Turkey, this figure is 20 percent. This means that Turkey cannot have a high economic growth rate unless it can raise its domestic savings to 24-25 percent--or even 30 percent--of the national income. This requires increases in public as well as private savings.

Question: How can this be done?

Answer: Increasing public savings first requires a serious tax reform. Those segments of the Turkish society which have been benefiting from the country's economic development but which have not been paying taxes must be immediately brought under the provisions of the tax laws and must be effectively taxed. Turkish citizens who own the whole country in every sense of the word must be made to pay taxes. Increasing private savings will require extensive reforms in the finance sector. Turkey's finance system, in its current state, cannot maintain the savings rate at 25 percent and cannot utilize its resources in an efficient manner. The nationalization of the banks can be a first step in this area. Let me add here that savings cannot be increased by changing the balance of wealth distribution to the disadvantage of low income segments as the Honorable Ozal believes. On the contrary, as the distribution of wealth becomes more disproportionate, savings decline.

Question: Do you have other reform proposals?

Answer: I would like to dwell upon the issue of wasting of resources. A lot has been said about waste at the State Economic Enterprises, but the private sector probably wastes more resources. The private sector wastes resources by wrong choices of technology, by underutilization of capacity, by small-scale company structures and by bad management. I am afraid the Honorable Ozal has done nothing to prevent this situation. In Turkey, a free market exists only in name, not in essence. Protectionism still continues, and the domestic market is dominated by monopolies or collaborating oligopolies. The wasting of resources cannot be prevented unless reforms are instituted with respect to protectionism and fair competition. The reorganization of the State Economic Enterprises is also an important problem, and our public sector has the experience and the economic and moral capacity to do that. Similarly, Turkey's classical public administration system must undergo a rationalization process.

Question: My last question is this Honorable Akat: The Honorable Ozal always talked about maintaining certain balances within the logic of his program, and he seemed to be unable to move outside the framework defined by these balances. Would not certain imbalances arise in the process of the structural changes you have just proposed? What must be done to prevent that?

Answer: Let me first say this: If you take reducing inflation as your only goal, as Ozal did, at the end, you cannot achieve even that goal; within a year or two, you may find yourself unable to resist the demands of the masses or even individual businessmen. As for your question, after the instruments of structural change are selected, theoretical policies which will insure the functioning of those instruments must also be implemented. Here, in my view, expansionist policies are imperative. A process of structural change cannot be initiated with recessionist policies. We criticized Ozal in that respect, and what we said turned out to be true. A structural change did not take place, and, furthermore, recessionist policies became impossible to continue to implement meaning that 2 years were wasted. However, I repeat: First structural reforms, then expansionist policies. Otherwise, a situation may result which may be even worse than the situation before 24 January 1980. Consequently, we must monitor the new economic team with the same alertness with which we followed Ozal.

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FOUNDING OF PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE PLANNED

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 18 Aug 82 pp 24-26

[Article, including interview with Luc De Smet and Mark Heirman of the International Peace Information Service: "We Are Going to Get our Own SIPRI -- A Belgian Peace Institute in the Making"; date and place not specified]

[Text] In the end, you no longer consider it a possibility and then suddenly, there it is. Belgium may shortly get a /national peace institute/ [printed in italics] after all. In Europe, our country has for years been sort of the third world in the area of research on war, and this may finally change. You may say that nobody is too old to learn, but why should that saying once again apply to us? Because, while in our neighboring European countries such initiatives took off successfully about 10 years ago, and in some cases even more than 20 years ago, for the first time in our country an important /bill/ [in italics] has been introduced in the year 1982 whereby our parliament, if it agrees to do so in the course of the coming months, will proceed with the establishment of a Belgian Peace Fund [BVF] and of a Belgian Peace Research Institute [BIVO].

True, in the past there has been a great deal of thinking about peace and security in our country too, but this usually occurred with a tireless Atlantic reflex in the back of the mind. Anyone who, in terms of defense, overstepped the mark the least little bit must certainly have been Moscow oriented and could thus a priori not be talked to. That would even have been dangerous. And thus, the guardians of our security and a few interested politicians, usually gathered around the figure of the minister of defense, talked always and solely with each other.

In the end, it turned into a club, where newcomers were looked at with suspicion. In 1979, the company found an appropriate and definitive home. Within the bosom of the Royal Military School, near the Jubelpark in Brussels, a Royal Higher Institute for Defense [KHID] was established. It was to become a center where upper level officers could receive additional training on a continuing basis and where they could make the necessary contacts with political and economic circles.

But aside from the Royal Higher Institute for Defense annex to the Royal Military School, the terrain remained fallow. Even during the eventful years of the late sixties, early seventies, what was possible, for example, in

Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands or the FRG, did not seem possible in our country. With the exception of the Free University of Brussels where, in the middle seventies, an effective center for the study of war was set up, through the efforts of the Dutch peace researcher Johan Niezing, no noteworthy initiatives took shape in our universities. As a matter of fact, at that time most of the professors and instructors of international relations were connected with the Royal Military School or the KHID.

Could sensible initiatives really be expected then? Even at the present time, at the Catholic University of Louvain the peace research course is still an elective. They are still not susceptible to renewal there in terms of ~~their~~ thoughts on peace and security.

Nevertheless, the idea of a /national/ [in italics] and /independent/ [in italics] institute, such as those which have often produced outstanding work abroad, continued to smoulder all this time in spite of the unfavorable political climate. In this respect, over the last 2 years we have even landed in a veritable waterfall. Especially because of the pressure of the growing peace movement which has clearly gained strength since last year's large peace demonstration, something had to be done.

Thus, on 16 May 1981, a number of representatives from, among others, the /Pax Christi/ [in italics] movement, the /Christian labor movement/ [in italics], and the younger generation of the /Socialist Party/ [in italics] gathered together with a rare collection of internationally recognized peace scientists at the Peace Center in Antwerp. The intention was for everyone to make a contribution to the drawing up of the draft statute of a new national peace institute to be set up. The result of these meetings was a bill which was recently introduced in the House by CVP [Social Christian Party (Flemish)] representative Wivina Demeester-De Meyer.

Hence, the meeting of 16 May marked the beginning. Similar initiatives had been brought up in the past, but, for lack of support from the most important political parties, all of them had hitherto remained stuck in the legislator's drawer. Thus, for example, in 1973 a decree proposal was introduced by Albert Van Hoorick (SP [Socialist Party (Flemish)]) in the Flemish Cultural Council, which requested the establishment of an Interuniversity Peace Research Institute. This initiative was followed by an attempt, supported by the Belgian bishops, to set up a center for peace research in connection with the 550th anniversary of the Catholic University of Louvain.

Another attempt was attributed to the so-called /Tuesday evening group/ [in italics], an informal assembly of prominent Catholics from academic and socio-economic circles. This group celebrated its 20th anniversary, on 17 October 1978, with a proposal to set up an international peace research institute on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of Belgium. The group sent a letter to the king. A similar initiative was also taken on the French speaking side. All in all, half of the members of the then government had signed one of these two documents, which showed a growing willingness in political circles to take these proposals seriously.

Thus, the Wivina Demeester bill looks like a possibility. In this respect, we interviewed Luc De Smet and Mark Heirman of IPIS [International Peace Information Service], Pax Christi's center for peace research which is also located in Antwerp. Both were closely involved with the development of the Demeester bill.

Question: Why is Belgium so late with the establishment of a national peace institute? Other countries such as Sweden, the FRG and the Netherlands have a long tradition in this area.

Mark Heirman: This is largely attributable to a lack of interest, especially on the part of political leaders. Even in the Socialist Party, this interest was very slight until 5 years ago. In the past, you could count the people within the various parties who showed interest in our foreign policy in general, and in our defense policy in particular, on one hand. There were five or six of them. In this sense, the peace movement forces the politicians to pay more attention to the problem. That is very noticeable within the CVP. The peace movement has caused that party a real headache. They realize there that it has all partly passed them by, and that they have neglected defense problems. They also know that as a result they have lost many votes. Wivina Demeester and Miet Smet from Lokeren are good examples of this new school, but recently Ignas Lindemans, who heads the ACV [Confederation of Christian Trade Unions] study bureau, has also produced large amounts of good work.

Question: Isn't the person of the president of such a party very important?

Mark Heirman: You cannot say of Leo Tindemans that he is a European. He is someone who thinks in Atlantic terms. Whereas the current president, Frank Swaelen, is much more in favor of our ideas. Swaelen even co-signed the proposal.

Question: How will our peace institute operate in the future?

Luc De Smet: The draft statute consists of two major parts. There were several proposals, and hence this is a kind of compromise. On the one hand, there will be a fund and, on the other hand, there will be a study center. They would start with the fund. It would be a body to distribute funds, the first task of which would be to find the necessary financial resources in order to be able, in a second stage, to establish the actual study center. The study center could, for example, follow the lines of SIPRI [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute], where people can study and where publications are regularly issued. Later on the fund would have to further distribute its money among the existing projects relating to peace research.

Question: You mentioned SIPRI and at the meeting of 16 May, the various directors of the most important foreign peace institutes were present. Were you inspired by what already exists abroad?

Luc De Smet: I mentioned SIPRI because when you say peace research, then you say SIPRI. They produce those well known annual reports. We will also make annual reports in our institute. The international management of our institute

will also be partly inspired by SIPRI. On the other hand, the idea of a fund is much closer to the West German example. The DGFK [German Peace and Conflict Research Institute] in the FRG does not conduct any research itself -- hence, it is quite different from SIPRI --, but it distributes its money among the movements, and even among the universities which conduct peace research. Hence, we have two models in Europe, the SIPRI model and the funds model. Wivina Demeester's bill consists of a combination of the two. In this sense, there was a clear European inspiration.

Question: Isn't there more required than only a good inspiration, I mean, why is SIPRI so well known?

Mark Heirman: The two most important elements for a peace institute to operate successfully are the interest of the scientific world and the never ceasing political pressure to take the results of the scientific research into account. The pressure coming from the large peace movement in Belgium, which is undoubtedly present at this time, will have to be sustained. But things don't look bad for Belgium anyway. Many politicians are positively inclined toward our institute. It is my understanding that even Guy Verhofstadt is not opposed to it. Only the financial aspect would present a problem for him. As far as the Socialist Party and the CVP are concerned, there is even a great deal of interest. Especially within the CVP, a more favorable wind is blowing at present.

Question: You seem very optimistic?

Mark Heirman: The current budgetary alternatives will not make matters easy for us, but I do believe that the pressure of public opinion is strong enough to give the proposal a good chance. We are much stronger than we were 5 or 10 years ago.

Question: Relative to the upcoming elections, is it always useful for our politicians to listen to public opinion or not?

Mark Heirman: In this respect, I'm going to be a bit cynical: if the missiles are deployed, then it will also be established. Call it then a moral quid pro quo on the part of our politicians to give themselves a clear conscience and not to step too much on the voters' sore toe.

8463
CSO: 3105/206

NEW PARTY CANDIDATES FOR MAYORAL ELECTION

PASOK Candidates

Athens EXORMISI TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 29-30 Aug 82 p 2

/Excerpt/ Following the recommendation of the PASOK Central Committee on Municipal Elections, the Executive Committee of the movement today announced the names of the new candidates it will support in the October municipal and communal elections. Following this action, there remains only the announcement of a small number of additional candidates whose names will be made known next week.

The Executive Office announced 27 new candidates for mayor as follows:

Agrinion: Stelios Tsitsimelis, mayor; Veroia: Andreas Vlazakis, accountant; Xanthi: Christos Khoukhos, professor; Rethymnon: Christos Skouloudis, chemical engineer; Orestiada: Andonis Tympanidis, civil engineer; Kordelio: Kostas Papadopoulos, civil engineer; Menemeni: Vasilis Magnisalis, pharmacist; Elevtheroupoli: Vangelis Marmidis, employee of the Public Power Corporation /DEI/; Litokoro: Thanasis Katsamangas, teacher; Mykonos: Dimitris Veronis, merchant; Leros: Giannis Andartis, civil engineer; Skopelos: Apostolos Provias, contractor of public works; Arakhova: Evangelia Granitsioti, architect; Arkh. Olympia: Angelos Mikhos, dentist; Andritsaina: Nikol. Nikolopoulos, merchant; Kamena Jourla: Liak. Liakos, topographer; Ypati: Alekos Mylonas, retired officer; Molaoi: Tho. Stamatianos, civil engineer.

Attiki Nome /Candidates/

N. Losia: Vasilis Koukouvinas, president of the Panhellenic Society of Pharmacists; N. Filadelfia: Pandelis Gretselias, lawyer; Kifisia: Mikhalis Kanokakis, physician; Petroupoli: Giorgos Gavogiannis, physician; Keratsini: Kanelos Lalos, assistant engineer; Poros: Kyriakos Kostellekos, farm broker; Erythres: Kritonas Gikokas, mathematician.

ND Candidates

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 29-30 Aug 82 p 2

/Text/ The New Democracy Party announced a new list of candidates it will support in the October elections as follows:

Aitoliko: Panagiotis Zinembis; Alimos: Andreas Mageirou; Vrondades (Khios) Markos Psoras; Glyfada: Mathaios Lioungas; Katerini: Kharalambos Tsivelekidis; Kozani: Nikolaos Papafilippou; Korydallos: Stathis Sarandesas; Kymi: Nik. Pitteros; Irakleia (Serrai): Konstadinos Tsianis; Lavrion: Khrysoula Stathaki; Methana: Spyros Papaioannou; Moskhato: Ioannis Tsakonas; Pylaia (Salonica Second District): Georgios Diamandopoulos; Filippiada: Konstandinos Panousis; Khios: Andreas Flatousis.

The nominations for mayoral candidates ND will support were made by a special committee to which the proper authorities submitted their views and after a study of the candidates' background was made.

The committee was headed by former minister Mitsotakis and its members were: A. Gelestathis, I. Kefalogiannis and G. Souflis, all former deputy ministers of interior. Also, Theof. Gatsios, Konstand. Simaioforidis, deputies and mayors of Aridaia and Kastoria respectively until September 1981, and politician G. Voloudakis.

The leader of the New Democracy Party made the final selection of candidates following the nominations. The committee is now dissolved and the remaining pending minor matters will be taken care of by the party machinery.

KKE-Int. Candidates

Athens I AVGI in Greek 29 Aug 82 p 1

Text7 The Press Office of the KKE-Int. Central Committee published the list of mayoral candidates of the democratic cooperation for additional municipalities in Attiki and provinces. The list of candidates it will support in the municipal elections is as follows:

In Attiki

Petroupoli: Giorgos Gavogiannis, physician; Ymittos: Andreas Lendakis, mayor; Kifisia: Michael Kanakakis, physician; Ilioupoli: G. Vasilikopoulos, entrepreneur; Filadelfia: Pandelis Gratzelias, lawyer; Marousi: Christos Vlakhos, professor; Korydallos: Per. Veliouris, physician.

In Provinces

Lamia: Lambros Papadimas, physician; Karpenisi: T. Seretakis, technician; Veroia: Andreas Valzakis; Litokhoro: Thanasis Katsomangas, teacher; Xanthi: Christos Khoukhos, professor; Igoumenitsa: Panagiotis Liakos, pharmacist; Elassona: Petros Khatzinas, civil engineer; Tyrnavos: Giannis Khakhoulis, agriculturalist; Kordellio: Kostas Papadopoulos, civil engineer; Menemeni: Vasilis Magnisalis, pharmacist; Stylida: Vangelis Papas, mayor; Kymi: Kostas Vamvas, retired officer; Aliveri: Lazaros Khrystostalis.

KKE Candidates

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 29 Aug 82 p 1

/Text/ The KKE Central Committee Press Office announced the third successive list of mayoral candidates it will support in the October elections /as follows/:

Athens Area

N. Irakleion: Evgenia Giannopoulou-Zografi, archeologist; N. Liosia: Vasilis Koukouvinas, president of the Panhellenic Society of Pharmacists; Agia Paraskevi: Mari Stathaki-Papadaki, municipal councilor, architect; N. Smyrni: Maria Iakobaki, physician; Glyfada: Thodoros Spondylidis, municipal councilor, architect; Alimos: Mikhalis Digalakis, craftsman; N. Pendeli: Khr. Fidopiastis, present mayor.

Other Cities

Pyrgos: Kostas Lambrou, economist; Zakharo: Giannis Tagaris, merchant; Aitoliko: Andreas Foundas, professor; Kalavryta: Christos Papadatos, veterinarian; Arta: Giorgos Fotoniatis, professor; Khania: Giorgos Katevanakis, civil engineer, president of the Technical Chamber of Commerce (West Crete); Thermes (Lesvos): Vasilis Vagiannis, present mayor, retired teacher; Amfikleia: Anast. Skourolakos, employee of the Union of Farm Cooperatives; Domokos: Kostas Garaganis, chemist; Stylida: Evangelis Pappas, accountant; Andritsaina: Nikos Nikolopoulos, merchant; Skopelos: Apostolos Proviás, contractor of public works; Elassona: Kostas Papakonstandinou, physician; Skiathos: Kostas Papadoulas, merchant; Kamena Vourla: Liakos Liakou, architect; Sofades: Nikos Damaras, lawyer; Skyros: Manolis Fregadis, merchant marine captain; Karpenisi: Dimitrios Seretakis, foreman.

7520
CSO: 4621/438

GOVERNMENT URGED TO WIDEN COOPERATION, INCREASE DIALOGUE

Athens ANDI in Greek No 211-212, 6 Aug 82 pp 10-12

Excerpts7 The government7 reshuffling has raised some hopes--restrained hopes to be sure--that the government of change can now overcome its initial weaknesses and proceed with its task in a more coordinated, more effective and determined way especially in the economic sector where it faces greater difficulties and shortcomings. Unquestionably, however, the PASOK government--in its previous and its present composition--is doing positive work toward modernizing and further democraticizing the country--necessary preconditions for any further progress toward socialistic transformation. This positive work--regardless of any "ifs" and "ors" we would like to associate with it--and this direction determine the position of every progressive, every democratic leftist on PASOK's side during its difficult march as government of change.

We do not intend, of course, to take a full inventory of the positive and negative aspects of the government of change during its first 9 months. We refer only to certain tendencies. And certainly one dangerous and harmful tendency of the first Papandreu government--at least as some ministers characterized it--was to promise many and great things which provoked strong reactions and created high hopes. As a result the talks which followed with those concerned limited the measures and draft laws to the limit of the "feasible." Such practice shows lack of satisfactory understanding of the reality, improvisations and poor consideration of the measures being adopted. Let us hope that the "reshuffling" will help put an end to such extremely serious mistakes which are harming the very idea of change.

There is no doubt that the excessive hopes PASOK cultivated in order to win the election is one of the reasons for the difficulties it faces today as a government. To a degree these difficulties are due also--without ignoring the political incitements of the opposition from the Right and the Left--to the strikes of certain less wronged branches of working people, such as the bank employees, which hurt trade and the overall economy of the country at a critical moment in the efforts for its revival and revitalization. But--as was revealed--behind such developments which hurt the very policy of the government and the progress toward change, are also errors, inexperience, personal and group ambitions by syndicalists and other PASOK cadres. More generally, it is evident that the government should be broadening and not narrowing its front; it should be broadening and not narrowing the spectre of the social and political forces supporting it.

Certain very intransigent PASOK leaders who are overcome by the arrogance of power and are now dreaming perhaps of their own new one-party state must realize that the self-reliance PASOK won in the 18 October 1981 elections is due to the consent of broad centrist and leftist forces which, despite any of their reservations about its program (reservations which to a degree were evident in the differentiation of the vote for the Eurocouncil) realized that this party could oust the Right from power and open the way to change only with their solid correlation.

More Dialogues

Since the 1977 elections but moreso since a year prior to the 18 October 1981 election, Papandreu slowly but surely made readjustments to some of his old declarations concerning the internal and external sectors by distinguishing the visions from present realities, by revising certain of his assessments about the role of Western Europe and by pointing out particularly the difficulties a PASOK government would meet for normalizing and revitalizing the economy. For such "revisions," dictated by the events themselves, the two KKEs attacked and accused PASOK of retreating and "turning to the Right." This can be easily proved if one refers to 1981 issues of AVGI and RIZOSPASTIS. One can say, therefore, that by their vote on 18 October 1981, 48 percent of the people approved these revisions which constituted a realistic policy which conforms to the international and domestic correlations. Now, however, that the PASOK government faces the harsh reality in the internal and external sectors--and the simplifications of the press claiming that the Right is responsible for all the troubles of the country are not enough--it is certain that there is need for greater and more effective communication between the government of change and the people. Some people suggest more appearances of the premier on TV. But the dialogue in the Chamber of Deputies and not TV monologues is much more democratic and more effective and strengthens parliamentarianism. The frequent communications and dialogues of the premier and his ministers with the press and the regular appearances of the premier in the Chamber of Deputies--which, according to his own pronouncements, is one of the three basic foundations of democracy--will help the task of the government of change.

Thus--ending at this point our effort to assess the government's work until now--we return to our original arguments that while criticism of the government is useful and necessary there is no place for polemics, for the undermining and even the neutrality by progressive parties, organizations and individuals against PASOK. Those who believe that some other left or centrist--or new parties will benefit of will "become inflated" by a PASOK failure are making a big mistake. Only if the government of change succeeds, only if it attains even some of its basic objectives can there by a new start for a social organization at a higher level and for a new policy for the country's development. A failure or even a fall of the PASOK government can lead only to retrogressions if not to national catastrophies.

But if the cooperation of those of us who do not belong to PASOK but who want the change is necessary, then it is more necessary for all PASOK followers without exception and especially for the PASOK leaders and members to be fully aware of what Papandreu has stressed many times: that their responsibility is great toward so many generations of Greeks who sacrificed themselves and struggled for the change and socialism and especially toward the future generations and the future of the nation itself...

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CSO: 4621/486

POLITICAL

GREECE

EXILED CHILEAN UNIONIST HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE

NC141320 Athens Domestic Service in Greek 1130 GMT 14 Sep 82

[Text] A conference of international solidarity with the people of Chile will be held from 24 to 26 September in Athens. At the invitation of the Greek General Confederation of Labor [GSEE], Mario Navarro, the exiled chairman of the Chilean Confederation of Workers, is in Greece to organize this conference.

The Chilean trade unionist leader held a press conference at noon today in the GSEE office and charged that, in the 9 years that elapsed since the fascist dictatorship took power in his homeland, 30,000 Democrats have been murdered and there are 100,000 political detainees in prisons, of whom 2,500 have disappeared without anything about their fate having been announced by the Junta. Mr Navarro also announced that preparations are being made for the declaration of a general strike at the initiative of the Copper [Workers] Federation.

Mr Navarro further said that the target of the Chilean trade unionist movement is the restoration of trade unionist and democratic rights, the release of all political detainees and the prevention of increase unemployment which now is 30 percent of the active population.

Mr Navarro concluded that, today, all the socialist governments and the international trade unionist movements are supporters of the Chilean people's resistance.

The press conference was closed by GSEE Secretary General Yeoryios Raftopoulos who, after expressing the Greek working people's full support for the Chilean people's struggle, stressed that the Greek working people are certain that Pinochet's dictatorship will be overthrown and that democracy and freedom for the people of Salvador Allende and Pablo Neruda will return. He added that the GSEE has made the symbolic donation of 100,000 drachmas to the Chilean Confederation of Workers.

CSO: 4621/502

PASOK PAPER REJECTS KKE CRITICISM, COOPERATION

NC121624 Athens EXORMISI in Greek 11-12 Sep 82 p 12

[From the "Political Issues" column: "The KKE and Its 'Criticism'"]

[Excerpts] The press conference KKE Central Committee Secretary General Kharilaos Florakis held last Tuesday was a mere summary and, in some cases, an explanation of the positions of the forthcoming 11th KKE party congress. Therefore, if we have something to say, we have to refer to these positions, the length of which does not even allow summarizing them in a simple political commentary.

However, what we have the right to point to is the "criticism" of the PASOK government, which makes up a large part of the document, a criticism that, as we have pointed out in the past, reaches the limits of an open attack that disrupts--despite the nice words to the contrary--the basis of the people's unanimity, which is so necessary in the difficult task which the PASOK government has to carry out among the various shoals.

PASOK does not intend to apologize to the KKE for its ideological platform, its program, its long- and short-term goals and its policy in order to achieve these goals. The people are its judge. And the people have been following and supporting PASOK's policy, which is confirmed in a thousand ways. The KKE is vainly trying to drive wedges between the PASOK leadership and its popular base. This is an effort that cannot be concealed either by the KKE positions or the statements by Florakis. It is easily understandable that the support of all the democratic progressive forces is desirable to realize change. But we do not understand why the cooperation of the KKE at the government level is necessary for this purpose--an issue which is now being put forward publicly. In view of the fact that PASOK has a self-sustained majority, such cooperation would be tantamount to adulteration of its program. Florakis speaks about a joint cooperation program, although no one has asked for such cooperation--which would mean an admission of weaknesses in the PASOK program--along with the marrying of two world theories and policies with fundamental differences--which would be tantamount to forging the popular mandate as it was demonstrated during the October elections.

In conclusion, we point out that this sharp "criticism" of PASOK is timed to take place on the eve of the municipal elections, which leads us to the

thought that the KKE is again seeking to achieve--in another way--what is failed to achieve during the October elections. It would probably be unnecessary to repeat our criticism at that time, a criticism of the KKE tactics which aimed at depriving PASOK of its majority so that the KKE could increase its chances of participation in the government--which was an extremely dangerous game during the struggle to remove the rightwing from power. Fortunately, the mature Greek people were not misled by such dangerous ways, because it is not known what the result would be. We cannot now adulterate the people's mandate thanks to the KKE "criticism" and proposals that have the same goal and that accuse PASOK of having failed to complete its program during the year it has been in power.

CSO: 4621/502

POLITICAL

GREECE

BRIEFS

KKE DELEGATION TO PORTUGAL--A delegation of the KKE Central Committee headed by Secretary General Kharilaos Florakis left this morning for a visit to Portugal at the invitation of the Portuguese Communist Party. [Text] [ND081914 Athens Armed Forces Radio in Greek 1800 GMT 8 Spe 82]

CSO: 4621/502

PCI DISSIDENT REPLIES TO PARTY'S ACCUSATIONS

'NUOVA UNITA' Editor's Introduction

Florence NUOVA UNITA in Italian 20 Jul 82 p 5

[Text] The Documents We Are Publishing

An authoritative official who for private reasons wishes to remain anonymous for the time being has sent the following documents to various newspapers and magazines, including NUOVA UNITA: a letter written by the president of the Lombardy PCI Regional Control Commission specifying "accusations" directed against Comrade Fausto Sorini, member of the Federal Committee of the Cremona PCI Federation, and Comrade Sorini's defense.

We are also publishing a brief summary of the verdict pronounced against his as issued by L'UNITA on 4 July. We wish to stress the fact that nothing about his case had been explained to the readers of L'UNITA or to PCI members by way of information on the subject; the newspaper's report only mentioned his penalty.

'L'UNITA' Report Republished

Florence NUOVA UNITA in Italian 20 Jul 82 p 5

["Report published by L'UNITA (4 July 1982)" headlined "Cremona: Comrade Fausto Sorini Suspended"]

[Text] Cremona--The CF [Federal Committee] and CFC [Federal Control Commission] of the Cremona PCI Federation met in joint session to discuss the political conduct of Comrade Fausto Sorini, member of the Federal Committee.

The conferees agreed that the actitivite of Sorini, contributor to INTERSTAMPA and chief editor of the Aurora Publishing House, "have not conformed to the norms of democratic life and the statutory regulations of the party, and are therefore censurable." They then decided, "according to the terms of Article 54 of the Statutes," to cancel his membership on the Federal Committee and suspend him from the party for 6 months.

Text of Lombardy Commission President's Report

Florence NUOVA UNITA in Italian 20 Jul 82 p 5

[Text] The Report Issued by the President of the Lombardy Regional Control Commission:

The List of Accusations

Fausto Sorini, member of the Cremona Federal Committee

--Took part on 4 November 1978 in a meeting with other persons from various cities at the La Brace Restaurant in Milan;

--Took part in discussing (and drafting) counter policies;

--Took part on 4 April 1980 in a meeting with others, including the president of the Aurora publishing firm;

--Took part in a meeting with others in a private residence in Florence on 24 January 1981, at which a coordinating committee was named to establish an alliance joining together INTERSTAMPA, Aurora and Pasti's "Struggle for Peace Committee." Sorini was appointed a member of the committee;

--Took part in a meeting with others on 19 September 1982 (in a private residence) in Florence, during which all those present agreed that they could no longer remain in the PCI because of its irreversible shift to social democracy. They proposed, therefore, to set up a new organization, with a newspaper of its own and other means of promoting a "growing initiative" to bear upon the national congress;

--Toward the end of February 1982 met in Florence with a group of Milanese and Romans (at the last moment the Romans failed to appear). At this meeting, Sorini notified the others of his contacts with certain embassies;

--Reportedly went with another Aurora official in April to Warsaw, where he was lodged at a hotel owned by the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party], and talked with various persons;

--In Milan on 15 May 1982 took part in a meeting of the INTERSTAMPA national coordinating committee, called to launch its cultural center and provincial offices. Before the meeting he conversed primarily with other persons.

Text of Sorini's Article

Florence NUOVA UNITA in Italian 20 Jul 82 pp 5-8

[Article by Fausto Sorini: "What Fausto Sorini Has To Say"; dated 28 June 1982, Cremona]

[Text] 1) Dear comrades, in my first and only encounter with the presidency of the Federal Control Commission (CFC) on 16 June 1982--with Comrade Azzoni,

secretary of the Federation, present--it was agreed that if only one of the citations against me mentioned in the letter written by Giovanni Brambilla, president of the Regional Control Commission (CRC) proved to be false, the credibility of the entire "list of accusations" would be invalidated [see above section--ed.]

I could limit my response by showing that more than one of his imputations are wholly unfounded (and I will do so in the following pages).

I have been repeatedly advised that my incrimination is not a question of procedure or a legal trial; all the same, I consider it my duty to put before you, my comrades, the most exhaustive recapitulation possible of my tribulations.

Questions of Method

2) I do not have much experience with statutes. This is the first time I find myself emmeshed in a matter of this sort, therefore I must confess that the proceedings conducted on my account leave me altogether bewildered. In my first and only meeting with the CFC presidency, I was notified that disciplinary measures were already being directed against me. Before these proceedings began, why was I never called for a political discussion, for a clarification, a hearing that would allow me to say what I have to say about alleged infractions against the party? Was it simply taken for granted that I was guilty beyond all doubt? Apparently so: Comrade Brambilla's letter states such things as "Sorini took part...he joined with...he participated...he informed...."

In his report to the CFC, Comrade Azzoni correctly uses his verbs in the conditional tense, giving room for doubts ("it is said that...he reportedly held... allegedly there were meetings...."). How did Brambilla and others arrive at their conclusions with such mathematical certainty?

Why were my actions never questioned in order to "evaluate my intentions apart from the proceedings undertaken to discipline me"? (Article 6-f of the Statutes) The Statutes provide that "recourse to disciplinary sanctions may be taken only when, in violation of the statutory rules, it is impossible to obtain a militant communist's respect for his duties through persuasion or criticism." Yet, in all these years the party has never faulted me for anything to do with discipline. Even assuming that I might have committed errors, why has no one ever summoned me for a session of "persuasion or criticism"?

I can only conclude that someone has been keeping a diary of my presumed mischief-making for a long time, ignoring Article 6-f of the Statutes, which declares that "every party member has the right to know in good time what criticisms and charges will be made against his conduct."

Can we reasonably believe that all my misdemeanors were discovered only a few days ago?

3) Again, Article 55 of the Statutes states that "a comrade subjected to any disciplinary procedure...must be given adequate means to defend himself." I must say, comrades, that this provision has not been respected.

I was summoned on 16 June 1982 and brusquely confronted with a long list of circumstances supposedly dating back to the end of 1978. I refuted the political substance of the accusations, and then asked for at least 2 month's time to reconstruct exactly and document fully all dates, places and circumstances so that I could prove my good faith. I also declared my availability to cooperate with the party in shedding full light on my case so that I could demonstrate the falsity of numerous offenses attributed to me. This request was denied, and I was conceded only 12 days.

Dear comrades, let me ask you this: Is there anyone among you who, in all conscience, would say that in only 12 days you could accurately reconstruct what you did and/or did not do on 4 November 1978, on 4 April 1980 and "toward the end of February 1982"?

Why was I not given the length of time I asked for?

Why such haste to begin the disciplinary process (before talking with me) and why such haste to bring it to its conclusion? Is there anyone who might have some personal reason for winding up the whole affair as quickly as possible? What is the reason? These are legitimate questions, and I want an answer because too many factors--the method of procedure, for example--strike me as extremely suspicious.

Consequently, I ask my CF and CFC comrades to forgive me for some of my imprecisions and to understand that they derive from the very short time granted me to collect the documentation necessary for my "adequate defense."

The Anonymous Witnesses

4) Article 55 of the Statutes states clearly that "the comrade subjected to disciplinary proceedings must be informed of the charges brought against him and the facts on which they are based." Obviously, an accusation becomes a fact only when it is proved. Here lies the difference between fact and calumny.

5) In my conversation with the CFC Presidency, I was informed that all the accusations are based on "testimonies" and "signals" presumably turned over to certain party leaders; those named in my presence were Comrades Cervetti and Brambilla. The persons who furnished these testimonies and signals, however, were meant to remain anonymous; they could therefore refuse to have a confrontation with me and with the CF and CFC, called upon to judge my case.

Thus, "the facts on which [the accusations] are based" would be the word of this or that party leader (single individuals, however authoritative) who would guarantee the "faith" and credibility of these anonymous witnesses.

Such methods, such ethics leave me truly perplexed.

6) Meanwhile, insistence on maintaining anonymity reveals much about the faith, dignity and credibility of the informer (or informers).

7) It is impossible to defend myself against anonymous accusations because there can be no confrontation. (If someone says: "In that meeting you said such and such," and I deny it, then who is right?) Since no one meets with himself or with anyone else, the testimonies given by others can be decisive. A confrontation is possible only with accusers who show their faces.

8) When accusations arise from unknown sources, then the word of the accused, who is not unknown, should be valid.

9) It is certainly not my intention to start a discussion on the good faith of Comrade Brambilla (or others), but their word cannot be accepted as valid because they are human beings (however authoritative); therefore they can make mistakes, or they could have been misled. I see nothing offensive in this if it is true that, in the past, errors of this kind have been committed even by outstanding leaders who have guided the workers' and the communist movements, and, indeed, our party. I do not want to make superficial comparisons with tribulations much greater than mine, but let me remind you of an analogy, the Cirillo episode. Maresca trusted her informant, Petruccioli trusted Maresca and Natta trusted Petruccioli; moving up from level to level, this provocation unfortunately misled the very top leaders.

An investigation founded on unverifiable testimony and a lack of proof can easily open the way to serious provocations incited by persons who seek to investigate controversies, dissension and ruptures within the party, or to exacerbate motives for friction in our relations, already tense and difficult, with out communist parties.

Comrades, the more I think about this sorry imbroglio involving myself, the less I am able to rid myself of the fear that our party stands in danger of being dragged into a gross contretemps, with my modest person exploited as a chance pretext.

10) Another thing: This is the eve of an enormously important national party congress, which will focus on a theme our top leaders are eager to debate: the crucial aspects of democratic centralism. We must understand that such a debate could determine--unintentionally--a climate wholly unfavorable to a free exchange of opinions, to tolerance, to respect for the convictions of others. After rivers of ink have been used to extol "guaranteeism," "the rights of man" and "laicism," this incredible attitude could only tarnish the party's image. It does not require much imagination to predict how promptly the bourgeois press would profit from such a reversal of our principles and make the most of it to underscore the lack of "democratic guarantees" in our ranks, hence discredit a democratic party in the eyes of the public.

11) Consequently, I do not consider my request unjustified if I ask, formally and in conformity with the rules of the Statutes, that the person or persons who denounce me assume their responsibility by making their identities known.

12) People are saying that "this is not merely a question of establishing proofs" since the "PCI is neither a state nor a tribunal."

That is certainly true; all the same, the PCI has put me under a political, highly inquisitorial procedure. "This is not merely a question of establishing proofs" is a definition that should apply to me as well as to everyone else. But no. I have been given to understand from the outset that my word is less trustworthy than the word of others. As if it were a court trial, the burden of proof is upon me, whereas my mysterious accusers are not required to abide by any such obligation. It should be just the opposite: not I who must show that I have not done or said this and that, but those who denounce me.

Even more than a political or procedural issue, this is a moral issue. Comrades, do you realize that if this attack on me continues, I am condemned from the very outset, however it may turn out, unless I can show minute by minute where I was, what I was doing, what I said at what time and in what place, even years ago?

The Statutes are correct in requiring "the facts on which [an accusation] is based" to be openly explained.

Characteristics of My Work

13) Before I take up the question of the accusations, my comrades should know how I perform my work so that you can understand my travels, contacts, collaborative commitments and movements, which otherwise could be maliciously described as "strange."

14) Since November 1978 I have been chief editor of the Aurora Cooperative Publishing House.

Apart from my normal duties as editor, my work has included:

--Collecting documentary material on various themes treated by my publishing firm. These themes were publicly announced when we issued our first book (July 1979);

--Supervising Aurora's archives;

--Maintaining contacts in Italy and abroad with other publishers, persons and agencies which can to some degree lend us editorial assistance or can supply us with documentary material;

15) My work also requires me to organize trips for undertaking reportages abroad to acquire on-the-spot material to use in publications, articles, interviews, and so on. Some examples are:

--My trip to Vietnam and Kampuchea to interview important persons (July 1981);

--A trip to Poland for interviews on Polish affairs (April 1982);

--A trip to Poland for interviews on Polish affairs (April 1982);

--A trip to Paris (February 1979) to collect material for a book on Afghanistan. For that purpose I visited the Afghan, Indian, Nicaraguan and Algerian Embassies (some of the most important embassies in Europe are located in Paris);

--Again on the subject of embassies, I maintain contact with the Italian Embassy in Hanoi and our ambassador to Vietnam, a friend of mine who has passed on valuable material to me;

--A trip to Paris (July 1979) to meet with Huu Ngoc, director of foreign language publications in Hanoi;

--Relations with the Bulgarian Sofia-Press and the Czech Orbis publishing firms;

--I have profited from tourist trips abroad (Cuba, the GDR) to establish collaborative relations with publishers there.

16) In preparing prefaces to books (by Xuan Thuy, Sandri, La Valle, Baget Bozzo), I am often required to travel.

17) As we have already stated publicly, "the members of the [Aurora] cooperative come from various regions of Italy, and some live abroad." It is my job to keep in contact with them to notify them of works under way, to obtain their pertinent ideas, and to solicit their cooperation in matters concerning editing, distribution and promotion of books in their areas, and self-financing.

Many caustic remarks have been made about Aurora's method of financing its ventures, but if our relations with clients were better understood, such untruths would never have been written or spoken.

18) Sometimes Aurora does not itself publish documentations collected from reports abroad, but offers and sometimes sells them to other publishers, newspapers and magazines.

Another method of self-financing: unpublished material sold to a widely circulated newspaper can yield more than hundreds of books.

19) On occasion, I have personally collaborated on journalistic activities; if any payment is forthcoming, the earnings are mine.

I have collaborated (or discussed forms of collaboration) with the party press, and given exclusive rights (through the foreign section and Comrades Azzoni and Cervetti) to the documentation I gathered during my travels in Vietnam and Kampuchea; to POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE, a publication of the Institute for Italy's Relations with Africa, Latin America and the Middle East (IPALMO), directed by G. C. Pajetta, Carlo Ripa di Meana, Piero Bassetti, Luigi Granelli and others; to INTERSTAMPA, PANORAMA, LA REPUBBLICA (to which I proposed material on Poland); and BOZZE, (the magazine headed by Raniero La Valle).

20) Regarding my material on Vietnam and Kampuchea, I received indirectly from Comrade Cervetti the following comment, quoted to me by Comrade Azzoni: "The material speaks for itself. But since Sorini is Aurora's chief editor and Aurora does not enjoy an odor of sanctity, nothing is being done with it." I well recall protesting against this example of discrimination. Aurora had never been excommunicated by the PCI's ruling organs; to the contrary, we have even been given free publicity in L'UNITA and RINASCITA. I appealed directly to

L'UNITA in Milan (Comrade Mantelli, in charge of the letters column) to see if I could write an article in the form of a letter, offering my total availability (but without naming Aurora); his answer, however, was negative. Only after long negotiations did I succeed in publishing a brief letter in his column. I must admit that this experience has not encouraged me to work with the party press.

21) A great part of my work with Aurora is documented in my copious correspondence. The president of Aurora has assured me that if he should receive a formal, written request from any leading PCI agency explaining its reasons for such a request, he would submit the matter to the administrative council for a decision. As a communist member of Aurora's council, I commit myself to support the request in the council should the party deem it necessary to clarify my position. I ask the party formally to advance such a request.

22) For years I have done my work openly, in the light of day, but never before has the party challenged me. Moreover, the same sort of work has been done, on a much higher and more influential level than mine, by dozens of journalist members of PCI, who often do not work for publishers connected with the cooperative movement but rather for bourgeois publications; the examples are infinite. Still, I do not see that the party has ever raised any objections to them.

The Contents of the Accusations

23) In Comrade Azzoni's note to Comrade Fogliazza, president of CTC, in which he conveys the information contained in the CRC president's letter, the objections charging me with disruptive political intentions are:

--"The existence of an organization coordinating INTERSTAMPA, Aurora and the struggle for Peace Committee on an operational level";

--"Contact with various embassies, maintained 'for the same purpose.'" All the charges stated in Comrade Brambilla's letter are meant to "prove" this purpose, even though--and this was admitted during my conversation with the CFC Presidency--some of them do not of themselves violate any terms of the Statutes. Hence, it is evident that if my alleged political designs are shown to be unfounded, many of the other imputations will have no substance. And now we come to the point.

24) In the following, under the heading "Charge" are the accusations specified in the CRC president's letter; under the heading "Reply" are my answers:

Charge: "He took part on 4 November 1978 in a meeting with other persons from various cities at the La Brace Restaurant in Milan."

Reply: The Aurora Cooperative Publishing House was registered at the courthouse in Varese on 12 December 1978. The meeting of the founding members was held in Varese on 11 November 1978, a week after 4 November, in the presence of a notary public. I remember that during the preceding days, there was more than one meeting with the founding members, or some of them, in Milan and Varese to

settle every detail before going to the notary public, to make decisions on the name of the cooperative, the president, the vice president, the administrative council, unions, auditors and so on. It would well be that one of these meetings did indeed occur on 4 November (I do not recall the names of the different restaurants to which we went).

Where is the violation of the Statutes?

Charge: "...he took part in discussing (and drafting) counter policies."

Reply: How, where, when and with whom? It is certainly true that during the campaign before the 15th National Party Congress I studied and worked out counterproposals and amendments to the party's policies. I also delivered a long speech before the CF on almost all the most controversial points. I discussed them with many comrades in and out of the CF. At the request of Comrade Renato Strada, now secretary of the Crema Federation (he was curious to hear my arguments), I spoke on these points for an entire evening. I proposed a number of amendments to the sectorial and federation congresses. And L'UNITA published my speech on "laicism" at the precongress gathering. In this respect it is true that I "took part in discussing and drafting counter policies. (It would be more accurate to speak of them as amendments.) In all this, where is the violation of the Statutes?

Charge: "He took part on 4 April 1980 in a meeting with others, including the president of the Aurora publishing firm."

Reply: That is right, only it wasn't 4 April 1980. This shows that whoever cited that date is misinformed. Let me give you the facts.

On 10 May 1980, conforming to the law, a second meeting was convoked, a general assembly of the cooperative members, in rooms at 15 Via Sanremo (the first convocation, which took place on 27 April 1980, lacked the number of persons required by law). On 20 April 1980 in the same rooms, a meeting of the administrative council was held to draw up its report. The minutes of this meeting are fully recorded. On 10 and 14 April 1980, only a few days previously and in the same place, there had been two sessions to prepare the documentation the administrative council then used to formulate its report. The president of Aurora was on hand for all these meetings except, I believe, the one on 10 April. I have been able to reconstruct these facts because the sessions were dedicated for the most part to questions concerning the budget; therefore, notes and written estimates were obligatory. Where is the violation of the Statutes?

Charge: "He took part in a meeting with others in a private residence in Florence on 24 January 1981, at which a coordinating committee was named to establish an alliance joining together INTERSTAMPA, Aurora and Pasti's Struggle for Peace Committee. Sorini was appointed a member of the committee."

Reply: This is an outright lie. I have never once taken part in any such committee, in fact I find absolutely no confirmation that any committee of the kind even exists. I have never had any contact with the National Struggle for Peace Coordination. I have seen Senator Pasti only once in my life, and that was when he came to Cremona with Senator Anderlini to deliver a lecture. (The Struggle for Peace Committee had not yet been founded.)

Moreover, the first number of INTERSTAMPA was issued at the end of April 1981. Isn't it odd that in January 1981, (4 months before) a committee was founded to coordinate an undertaking that hadn't yet existed?

On the other hand, I do not deny that I went to Florence in January 1981 for professional purposes (unfortunately I have no notes on this). In order to reconstruct the details, I should have to go to Florence and talk with the Aurora staff there. If I am allowed the necessary time, I am sure I could do it. At any rate, I remember that at the time we were dealing with an associate in Florence on problems of distributing a book of his, but not published by Aurora. My correspondence on this matter dates back to the end of December 1980. I recall visiting this man at his home, which probably occurred during the following month--that is, January 1981.

Charge: "On 19 September 1981 he met with other persons at the INTERSTAMPA offices in Rome." [as published; not included in published list of Lombardy Commission president's charges]

Reply: Although the letter does not specify my participation, I would like to explain a few particulars so that no one will accuse me of holding anything back. I have already mentioned my collaboration with INTERSTAMPA. I couldn't swear to the date, but it is possible to go back. I remember going to Rome in September 1981 to consign the material on my travels in Indochina (having returned from there at the end of July) to the party's foreign section on the Via Delle Botteghe Oscure. This charge possibly refers to the record of that mission.

Possibly on the same day I went to the offices of INTERSTAMPA, then on the Via di Torre Argentina, only a few steps from Botteghe Oscure, to say that INTERSTAMPA could publish my material should L'UNITA turn it down. I also spoke of this matter to the editors of PANORAMA, IL PONTE and BOZZE magazines. When the party did turn me down, I sent the material to PANORAMA, which published a piece on Kampuchea, and to BOZZE.

I cannot understand why I am held guilty for collaborating with INTERSTAMPA. The party has never taken a stand against it; furthermore I am not on its editorial staff or board of directors, whose names are public and printed on the cover. Why don't my accusers turn on them?

Charge: "He took part in a meeting with others which all those present agreed that they could no longer remain in the PCI because of its irreversible shift to social democracy. They proposed, therefore, to set up a new organization, with a newspaper of its own and other means of promoting a 'growing initiative' to bear upon the national congress."

Reply: I am not certain of the date, but I remember being in Florence in January 1982, having been invited to attend a meeting of INTERSTAMPA'S editorial staff and board of directors (this preceded publication of the second issue in the new series edited by Napoleone; it came out at the beginning of February). Because I had already collaborated with INTERSTAMPA, as I have said, I was asked to join their editorial staff, but I declined because I already had enough commitments.

If this is the Florence meeting to which my accuser refers, then the points he makes about what happened at it are untrue. The subject under discussion was the magazine, not the "national convention" or the PCI's "irreversible shift to social democracy"--a notion my close comrades know very well is not one I subscribe to. What is more, if I had any such idea in mind, do you suppose I would be here to defend my membership in the party?

Charge: "Toward the end of February 1982 he met in Florence with a group of Milanese and Romans (at the last moment the Romans failed to appear). On this occasion, Sorini notified the others of his contacts with certain embassies."

Reply: This is a gross falsehood which confirms the spurious nature of the whole list of accusations. All through the month of February and up until today, I have never set foot either in Florence or in Tuscany. Unless by telepathy, therefore, I couldn't possibly have taken part in any meeting to tell about my contacts with embassies.

Charge: "He reportedly went with another Aurora official in April to Warsaw, where he was lodged at a hotel owned by the PZPR, and talked with various persons."

Reply: Curiously enough, this is the only point using the conditional tense of the verb, that is admitting doubts. Why? Possibly because whoever wrote that document thought that my trip to Poland was a special secret mission? To the contrary, of all the points aimed against me, only this one has been openly clarified in my article published by INTERSTAMPA after the letter had been sent to Comrade Giuseppe Azzoni, as we must deduce from his letter to Comrade Foglizza, dated 10 June 1982. That article, by the way, included a wealth of information on the interviews collected during the kind of normal journalistic assignment reporters from Warsaw and every part of the world carry out every day.

My trip was by no means clandestine. After 4 days in Warsaw, on 24 April 1982 I went to see Comrade Romolo Caccavale, correspondent for L'UNITA. He invited me to dinner and we spent the evening together. I told him where I was staying, how I was doing my work in Poland and what I had in mind to do in the following few days.

All the interviews were tape-recorded so that I could quote my interlocutors verbatim (except for the last one, the mayor of Gdansk, because I had run out of tapes) and all this material is stored in the Aurora archives. I had not a single conversation with anyone of the PZPR or the government that was not recorded from start to finish. Let me state here that PCI policies were never mentioned (except in reply to a general question on the subject when the questioner repeated exactly the same words Jaruzelski had spoken before the Central Committee on 24 February 1982, which had already been made public). This was both by my choice and the preference of all my interviewees for easily understandable reasons (since I was a PCI member, there shouldn't have been any doubts about my presence in Poland as a journalist, not as a party member).

Among other mistakes, it is untrue that the hotel I stayed at with Bera is the property of the PZPR; it belongs to the government. Since the country was in a state of [civil] war, I was assigned to the hotel by the Polish Embassy in Rome, not by the Polish tourist agency, which usually makes all such arrangements.

Charge: "In Milan on 15 May 1982, he took part in a meeting of the INTERSTAMPA national coordinating committee, called to launch its cultural center and provincial offices. Before the meeting he conversed privately with other persons."

Reply: False. On 15 May I was neither in Milan nor in the province of Milan. For the nth time we see how irresponsible the accusations stated in the letter are.

In Regard to Other "Methods"

25) For some time now, base slander has been circulating about me, even within the party. Here I will cite two examples:

a) Someone of another PCI federation apparently declared in the presence of several witnesses that my political battle is a matter of profit to me because I am paid by the communist countries. The person who notified me of the incident (in a signed letter dated 7 January 1982) offered to put himself at my disposal to expose it publicly. This same comrade reported the incident immediately to the secretary of his federation and to other leaders, and asked for a confrontation--before the executive boards--with the person spreading the rumor. But the executive boards just let it slide. No one said anything to me. Why? Yet such slander is a serious offense against a comrade member of another federation. Did someone want to spread such a lie? At the time I took no notice, because I did not want the matter to degenerate into a shameful controversy. But now I realize that I was wrong; here I am subjected to a disciplinary action because of just such imputations. If the CFC deems it proper to open an inquiry so that full light can be shed on my case, I am prepared to prove everything I have said.

b) A similar piece of mischief occurred, this time within our federation, and my accuser is actually a member of a group of party leaders. There are two witnesses; after they have confirmed their statements in writing, I reserve the right to divulge their names, since I have no intention of quoting anonymous witnesses.

The "Rapport of Faith"

25) [as published] In my meeting with the CFC presidency and subsequently in other informal conversations (with my sectional secretary and a member of the federation secretariat) vague references were made to the "rapport of faith," which is also covered by the Statutes. Indeed, Article 54, on disciplinary sanctions, declares that "Expulsion can be decided when, apart from a censurable conduct, [the accused] has failed to honor the rapport of faith inherent in his party membership." I have already covered the subject of my "censurable conduct"; here I should like to examine the question of my "faith," to begin with confirm-

ing once again that in all these years until 12 days ago, no violation of the Statutes has ever been ascribed to me by the party in connection with any of my activities.

26) I enrolled in the PCI in 1974 and worked with my party section until 1977. I was then asked to become an official, to which I agreed, and took up my duties in February 1977, being relieved of them in the summer of 1978. I protested to the CF, which discussed the matter, that my dismissal was a case of political discrimination, motivated by "organizational" demands. A member of the federation secretariat admitted to me privately in his office that it was indeed a political move, and I thanked him openly before the CF (but without naming him) for his frankness. Subsequently, Comrade Abeni, federation secretary at the time, suggested that I head up the Commission on Problems of the State, and I accepted the offer. At the February 1979 federation convention in preparation for the 15th National Congress, I fought my political battle openly; but once the congress was under way, without any explanation given me, I was no longer proposed as head of the Commission on Problems of the State or any other commission. One member of the federation's executive committee told me, "It makes sense. You fought a political battle and lost; now you're paying for it." In a party founded on democratic centralism, this was clearly an act of political discrimination contrary to the Statutes.

Although in the CF I had objected to certain provisions in the proposed policies, at the two sectional conventions I was sent to chair (at Trigolo and Azzanello) during the precongress campaign, speaking in the name of the party, I supported the political line approved by the Central Committee. The minutes and witness reports by those present will endorse what I am saying.

After the federation convention, which reconfirmed me in the CF with an almost unanimous vote, I was assigned to the Commission on International Problems, to the editorial division of LOTTA DI POPOLO [THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE], to the Commission on Problems of the State and to the press and propaganda section. After a time I withdrew from the last two on the conviction that it was useless to participate on paper in four commissions when just about all of them functioned badly; therefore, I remained only in the first two. The commission on foreign affairs never called on me for a single action. For approximately 6 months the LOTTA DI POPOLO editorial staff has not used my services once, although I have protested repeatedly to the federation secretary and to Comrade Corada, of the secretariat.

Since 1979 I have not been called on for any kind of assembly or rally (electoral, referendum or L'UNITA festival) or for any meeting or activity in any party section, even though when speaking in the name of the party I have always proved my strict adherence to the rules of democratic centralism. I was summoned only once--that was last year--to preside over the sectional convention at Pescarolo, where I stoutly upheld the party's policies on Afghanistan and on "the power politics of the Soviet Union," even though I disagreed with them. (See the minutes. Let those who were there heed me, beginning with Comrade Mariotti, of the federation's Executive Committee, who delivered the introductory political report.) Various members of past and present secretariats protested verbally and repeatedly the failure to "utilize" my services.

27) I bring up these facts because it is my impression that for the past several years [certain persons] have been discriminating against me because of my opinions. This is an infraction of the rules stipulated in the Statutes. Mind you, this hostility began before I committed any of the alleged misdeeds imputed against me on the "list of accusations."

28) You can therefore understand why since 1979 I have confined my party activities to my own Castelleone section, which I see as the most forceful argument for assessing my "rapport of faith" with the party (given the fact that I have been conceded no possibility of confirming my "faith" in any other way). Why then, have the sectional executive committee, the honest men and the assembly of party members neglected to review my case before initiating disciplinary action against me? Obviously not to inquire into what I have done in Milan or Rome but simply to pronounce a verdict on my "rapport of faith."

29) I declare that should the question of my "rapport of faith" be formally raised before a verdict is pronounced, the CF and CFC must of necessity hear the views of my section's executive committee and the general assembly of enrollees.

Conclusion

30) Dear comrades, I have done my utmost to give you an exhaustive report on the accusations moved against me. Too many circumstances have been unfavorable to me, among them, let me remind you, my embittered frame of mind and my disillusionment. I ask your forgiveness for not clarifying and documenting my case as thoroughly as I should have liked; I leave it to you to judge how well I have succeeded. Meanwhile, I am at your disposal if you have any requests for further information.

I am convinced that this whole issue is a political problem, not simply a "Sorini case," however involved I am in it. Again I confirm my availability to continue the confrontation on a political (but not inquisitorial) basis, including every problem related to my work, my political activities and my present status in the Italian Communist Party files, in the hope that I can still militate in our ranks for a long time to come.

'NUOVA UNITA' Editorial

Florence NUOVA UNITA in Italian 20 Jul 82 p 5

[Editorial: "The PCI Congress Has Begun; The Leaders' Methods"]

[Text] A lay, pluralist, tolerant, democratic PCI--this is the image the party has been cultivating over the years. When Berlinguer is obliged to admit that contrasting ideas and certain problems do indeed exist in the party, he feels the need to state openly, as he did in his televised press conference of 7 July, that dialectical approaches vary but that the differences between the political currents are treated in the most democratic way possible.

This statement is certainly not true. This is demonstrated by the vicissitudes of Comrade Sorini and the action brought against him by the Lombardy PCI Control Commission. Pluralism, tolerance and internal democracy are evidently reserved only for those who agree with the party bosses; but whoever dissents and fights

for his ideas is subject to disciplinary measures. To put it clearly, let us explain that laicism, tolerance, pluralism and internal democracy are considered values by the PCI leadership only if they oppose Marxism-Leninism and authentic socialism, which they look upon as aberrations of human reason, intolerance, antidemocracy and aspirations for absolute power and authoritarianism. This is why Sorini's attitudes on various issues have not been openly contested in what should be a procedure for party debate; instead, his conduct has been denounced in such a way that he is marked as a separatist maneuvering in the dark.

Pluralism vanishes when Berlinguer's cohorts are compelled to settle issues of class, ideology and political positions within the party. Dissent is acceptable to the USSR and Poland, but not to the PCI. The very same persons who deplored the Stalin trials in Moscow hold trials themselves, sentence and expel comrades from executive boards, and suspend a Cremona man from party participation. But all this makes sense: the PCI congress is coming up. Apparently it has already begun for the party leaders, intent upon wiping out any opposition by disarming individual comrades through disciplinary measures, thereby seeking to intimidate others and induce them to hold their tongues. It is their method of silencing any factions that could give them battle at the congress.

We know these methods well. During the Khrushchev era in the early 1960s, many of us submitted to the same treatment, and comrades in many parts of Italy were expelled from the party. How can we resist this anti-Leninist witch hunt? By fighting in the open with greater courage and determination, by exposing the chambers where disciplinary "trials" are conducted, to strike not only at individual tug-of-war but a collective conflict. Thus we must henceforth fight vigorously to unite all communists, to join together, organize, and eliminate sectarianism, underevaluations and Macchiavellianism.

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PCP REVIEWS RECRUITMENT CAMPAIGN

Lisbon O MILITANTE in Portuguese Aug 82 pp 3-6

[Text] Make the party bigger, strengthen democracy--recruiting drive, March to June 1982, PCP [Portuguese Communist Party].

The final figures for the drive show that 5,699 new party members were recruited during the months of March to June of this year.

First of all, we can say that the campaign slogan "more than 5,000 new comrades by the end of June!" was implemented.

The recruiting of about 5,700 new party members is an important contribution to its ranks, to the increase and improvement of the organization, as well as of party activities and influence in all of the country's regions.

Recruiting by Regions

The goal of this drive was divided up for each of the regional organizations, keeping in mind the relative number of their members but also the need for expanding the numerically less strong organizations.

The table below shows that these regional quotas were not obtained only in Lisbon, Santarem, and Leiria. The Lisbon Regional Organization achieved 97.4 percent of its goal, the Santarem Regional Organization obtained 97.3 percent, and the Leiria Regional Organization wound up with 90.0 percent.

The Lisbon Regional Organization however ended up with the largest number of new recruits, followed closely by the regional organizations of Porto and Setubal.

Regarding the quotas of each of the organizations, the Autonomous Organization of the Azores achieved the highest percentage, recruiting exactly twice the number it had aimed for. Then we come to the previously mentioned regional organizations of Porto and Setubal with percentages of 137.5 and 133.6, respectively.

Looking next at the Regional Organization of Tras-os-Montes, which exceeded its recruiting quota by more than 10 percent, the other regional organizations all were very close to their respective quotas.


This shows the importance of having a goal in inspiring goal attainment.

Recruiting Drive "More than 5,000 New Comrades by the End of June!"

(1) Organização Regional ou de Região Autónoma	(2) Quota correspondente para a metade geral	Recrut. no mês de (3) Março	Recrut. no mês de (4) Abril	Recrut. no mês de (5) Maio	Recrut. no mês de (6) Junho	Total de (7) Março a Junho	(8) % em relação à quota
Minho	300	81	57	50	118	306	102,0
Trás-os-Montes	150	45	36	43	42	166	110,7
Porto	750	306	275	226	223	1030	137,5
Beira Litoral	350	101	89	77	99	366	104,6
Beira Interior	150	50	27	22	52	151	100,7
Leiria	200	16	8	89	67	180	90,0
Santarém	300	48	51	73	120	292	97,3
(9) Lisboa	1200	205	314	344	306	1169	97,4
Setúbal	750	209	231	225	337	1002	133,6
Alentejo	550	108	141	133	172	554	100,7
Algarve	200	23	41	38	98	200	100,0
Açores	50	18	41	18	23	100	200,0
Madeira	50	19	15	6	11	51	102,0
(10) Emigração e outras organizações	—	—	—	—	—	132	—
TOTAL	5000	1229	1326	1344	1668	5699	114,0

Key:

1. Regional Organization or Autonomous Region Organization
2. Quota Corresponding to General Goal
3. Number of Persons Recruited in March
4. Number of Persons Recruited in April
5. Number of Persons Recruited in May
6. Number of Persons Recruited in June
7. Total, March to June
8. Percent Compared to Quota
9. Lisbon
10. Emigration and other Organizations



Key:

- ORM--Regional Organization of Minho
- ORT--Regional Organization of Tras-os-Montes
- ORP--Regional Organization of Porto
- ORBL--Regional Organization of Beira Litoral
- ORBI--Regional Organization of Beira Interior
- ORLEI--Regional Organization of Leiria
- ORSA--Regional Organization of Santarem
- ORL--Regional Organization of Lisbon
- ORS -- Regional Organization of Setubal
- ORA--Regional Organization of Alentejo
- ORAL--Regional Organization of Algarve
- ORAA--Regional Organization of the Azores
- ORAM--Regional Organization of Madeira

With relation to the provisional figures we published in our bulletin last month, based on information obtained during the last few days of June, it must be emphasized that, as expected, some individuals were still recruited by the end of that month so that the total number went up by a little more than 100. But we must note that some reports had to be corrected; they were not backed up by the corresponding number of new membership cards and this is why there are four final figures which turn out to be a little less than the preliminary figures given earlier.

In addition to the new comrades who joined the various regional organizations, the drive also netted 132 comrades who are included in the emigration groups or in other organizations directly connected with the Central Committee.

Social, Age, and Sex Breakdown

The table below shows the social makeup of the new comrades recruited during the drive.

(1) N.º de recrutamentos	5699	%
(2) Operários	3199	56,1
(3) Operários industriais	2761	48,4
(4) Operários agrícolas	438	7,7
(5) Empregados	1094	19,2
(6) Pequenos e médios agricultores	77	1,4
(7) Intelectuais e quadros técnicos	171	3,0
(8) Vários	1158	20,3
(9) Menos de 30 anos	3065	53,8
(10) De 30 a 50 anos	1791	31,4
(11) Mais de 50 anos	843	14,8
(12) Mulheres	1390	24,4

Key: 1--Number of Persons Recruited; 2--Workers; 3--Industrial Workers; 4--Agricultural Workers; 5--Employees; 6--Small and Medium Farmers; 7--Intellectuals and Technical Cadres; 8--Miscellaneous; 9--Less than 30 Years; 10--Between 30 and 50 Years; 11--Over 50 Years; 12--Women.

The fact that more than 56 percent of the newly recruited individuals are workers is an excellent indication that the party is continuing to draw strength primarily from among the workers in production, the manual workers, from among the working class. It is quite natural that the share of agricultural workers should be smaller in view of the trend toward a decline in agricultural workers among the active population although during this drive, in the regional organization of Alentejo, the number of farm workers exceeded the number of industrial workers.

The number of peasants recruited is very small. In terms of percentages, it is less than the number characterizing the party's current makeup. From this we can conclude that the effort to recruit more small and medium farmers must not be

neglected; we must be constantly concerned with that and we must try to guide our recruiting efforts in that direction.

The number of intellectuals and technical management personnel in percentage terms is likewise definitely smaller than their actual weight in the party organization. In this respect likewise it is necessary in all regional organizations to take some measures to do more recruiting on these population strata.

Concerning the age makeup, we must fundamentally report the excellent percentage of young people we recruited: 53.8 percent of the comrades are under the age of 30, and those under the age of 20 account for 17.6 percent of that group.

There are however major differences in keeping with the various regions; the percentage of new comrades under the age of 30 dropped to 32.5 percent only in Algarve. And it is less than 50 percent in the regional organizations of Santarem with 38.4 percent, Setubal with 39.3 percent, Alentejo with 40.5 percent, and Lisbon with 48.2 percent. In all of the other regions, the new members under the age of 30 number more than those over the age of 30, with the former attaining percentages of more than 80 percent, for example, in Tras-os-Montes.

Recruiting aimed at the youngest individuals is a question which we must always keep in mind, particularly, in certain regions. We obviously do not need to say that we should not recruit comrades who are not so young or who are somewhat older but we must at least make up for this kind of recruitment with young folks of either sex.

Here we must also report the percentage of women recruited during the drive. In this respect likewise we can say that the drive was very positive because the percentage attained is higher, in other words, the current percentage exceeded the percentage existing in the party's ranks. But this is primarily due to some organizations, especially those in Setubal and Lisbon, where recruiting among women exceeded or almost equalled 30 percent.

In some regions, generally speaking, where there was more recruiting of young people, there was less recruiting of women. The social commissions and the traditional clout of the reactionary movement help explain both of these situations.

Importance of Recruiting

The various organizations must discuss the development and results of the recruiting drive.

As we said before and as we wrote many times, we must devote constant attention to recruitment.

Analyzing this drive, a comrade said recently: "You are going to have recruiting in an organization that is on the ball."

And that is the truth. But recruitment is not only a good indication of an organization's life; it can and must also serve to motivate the organizations and to get them to take action.

We must raise the level of understanding of the importance of recruitment. We must keep in mind the fact that recruiting is indispensable for the party's natural renewal, to make up for the continuous losses in any organizations which are due to transfers, death, and other departures.

As we get a better knowledge of the organization as such, we can give their members more help and we can improve their links and their participation. But sometimes we must also keep in mind that there are comrades who do not really belong in the party, who are detrimental to its prestige, and who, instead of helping, only cause trouble in party activities. It is true that failure to keep proper tabs on these comrades may be the cause of a certain alienation from the ideas and values that characterize us. But the truth is that there are always cases of comrades who move away from us and/or who are not interested in continuing in the party.

In relation to that it is necessary always to keep in mind the responsibility of the leading organizations concerning situations of dissociation which may arise and we must under no circumstances make any hasty decisions that fail to take into account the possibility of contacting, convincing, and winning back comrades who have drifted away or who have lost their motivation.

At any rate, it is very important for each organization constantly to work toward recruiting new party members who will make up for our losses and beyond that. Recruiting is necessary to renew the party but it is also necessary to expand and strengthen the organization.

Many party organizations still have a rather low influence level, sometimes a very low level, in the environment in which they are established. Recruiting assumes even greater importance particularly in relation to those organizations because, since conditions are not sufficient, it is necessary to make sure the organization's ranks will achieve a certain quantitative level so that they may then achieve a qualitative advance in terms of their influence and activity. Recruitment in the most difficult regions and in the weakest organizations must be viewed not only as a constant task but as a high-priority task.

Among the analyses that have been made concerning this drive, we are struck by the comment to the effect that there are good prospects for recruiting at least in some organizations, even in regions where the party's influence is very great.

This must be kept in mind. We must keep in mind that life shows many people that they have been deceived especially in these times in which we live.

Some people have been able to see that PS [Socialist Party] leaders not only (always) filed socialism away in some file drawer but are even doing the same thing with April in putting it away in a drawer.

Others have seen that the adventurous and left-wing positions have nothing to do with the revolution although it may seem so in words only; they have not led to anything constructive.

Still others, many others, have learned from life what the demagogic of reaction is and what happened to Portugal because they were deceived into voting for the reactionary parties, within "AD" [Democratic Alliance], which is misgoverning Portugal.

This is why, in talking about the importance of recruiting, we must add that it is also indispensable when it comes to winning over to the party many of those who are shifting politically and who, through their militancy in our party, can make a valuable contribution to our struggle, to the struggle of the working masses, to the struggle of our people.

It is certainly worth coming back to this topic again later as well as other topics which are closely tied into the recruiting drive that must be mounted.

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PCP SEES THREAT IN CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION

Lisbon O MILITANTE in Portuguese Aug 82 pp 7, 11

[Text] The process of constitutional revision is approaching its end with the conclusion of the debate and the voting in the full Assembly of the Republic. The amendments to the constitution approved following the scandalous accord of the PS [Socialist Party]/Mario Soares with "AD" [Democratic Alliance] however do not yet have the force of law. The fact is that they remain yet to be promulgated by the president of the republic.

The same forces that approved a coupist revision directed against democracy, are already unleashing a pressure campaign aimed at securing the immediate promulgation of these changes to speed up their entry into force.

The fight in defense of the constitution is thus entering a new phase which is particularly important. If the proper body does not impede the revision resulting from the accord between the "AD" and PS/Mario Soares, then everything must be done so that the process of drafting the regular laws, on which depends the effective execution of the amendment, will not lead to an even further aggravation of its results.

The fact is that the voting in the full Assembly of the Republic entirely confirmed the expectations and warnings given by the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] as to the dangers deriving from the accord between the PS and "AD" against the democratic system. The final phase of the review work by the way would be characterized by a real flood of points yielded by the leaders of the PS in response to the demands of the "AD." The latter not only managed to get approval of the points pertaining to the reduction of the powers of the president of the republic, pertaining to the governmentalization of the system, the dismantling of the system for supervising the condition of constitutionality, but also demanded the elimination of the Revolutionary Council before the entry into operation of the bodies that will replace it, giving rise to an aberrant period of transition which will only bring new threats to the democratic system.

"AD" thus obtained a revision from the PS which will serve its objectives of keeping itself in power in order, during a later phase, to carry out its plan for the destruction of the democratic system in all of its breadth. This is what clearly emerges from a detailed analysis of the way in which the PS leadership has been yielding to the parties of reaction on fundamental issues involved in constitutional revision: The termination of the CR [Revolutionary Council], the military commands, the powers of the PR [President of the Republic] with relation to the government, and the Constitutional Court.

Termination of CR and New Period of Transition

First of all, the accord between "AD" and PS/Mario Soares concerning the temporary standards for the amendment of the constitution led to the approval of the termination of the CR without any regard as to the overall and balanced redistribution of its powers and, in particular, adequate substitution in the exercise of its functions as the supreme guarantor for the control over the constitutionality of the laws and fidelity to the spirit of 25 April.

Now, the PCP, in its constitutional revision draft, did not propose the elimination of the CR because it realizes that, under current circumstances, it is impossible--without causing a danger to the defense and strengthening of Portuguese democracy--to find ways of redistribution and substitution of important functions and constitutional authority. We hoped in vain that the PS, the advocate of the immediate termination of the CR, would come up with solutions that would demonstrate that it was possible and even easy, after the termination of the CR, sufficiently to guarantee the continuation of the defense of the democratic and constitutional system through its own institutions.

During the debates, the PCP alerted everyone to two essential issues: First of all, the voting on the termination of the CR would have to be a consequence of a discussion and a vote on alternate solutions concerning its authority and function (specifically in the field of military legislation and administration, in control over constitutionality, and in the consultative functions of the PR); second, the vote on the elimination of the CR, if it was to take place, would, as a minimum democratic precaution, require that there would be a concomitant vote on a temporary standard that would fully assure the exercise of its functions, specifically, its functions as the supreme body for control over constitutionality, for the period of time between the entry into force of the amendments to the constitution and the date of entry into operation of the Constitutional Court and the other bodies that would have to replace the CR.

Negotiating with "AD" outside the Potential Commission for Constitutional Revision and the full assembly (whose work was in effect paralyzed), the PS--after a solemn public declaration according to which it would reject any clauses liable to threaten the regular and legal nature of constitutional revision and the functioning of the institutions--yielded to all of the demands of "AD" with the single "argument" to the effect that, without this kind of yielding, "there would be no revision at all." This is how "AD" got what it wanted: The elimination of the CR under conditions spiting and offensive to the Captains of April and causing serious threats to the stability and survival of democratic institutions.

Governmentalization of Military Commander Selection

On the other hand, in spite of all of the efforts of the consistent democratic forces and the broad public opinion movement against the idea of giving the executive branch the power to pick the military commanders, the PS, in the full Assembly of the Republic, pushed through a reduction of the powers of the PR in this important area.

This solution consisted of the constitutional revision draft of the FRS but was originally submitted by "AD" in its program for the 5 October 1980 election. Only after the reelection of Gen Ramalho Eanes on 7 December 1980 did some socialist leaders adopt the proposal of "AD" after which they promoted to a key point one of the ideas presented and approved in the congress in order to be finally included in the FRS draft. The undeniably diligent role of some PS leaders on this issue cannot obscure the real people behind this (the parties of "AD") so that these PS leaders emerge as the interference runners for "AD" whose chestnuts they pulled out of the fire.

In voting against this solution, the PCP once again brought out the two essential issues that motivated its firm opposition to this part of the accord between "AD" and PS/Mario Soares.

First of all, the PCP says no to the idea of placing the Armed Forces under government control; under current circumstances, this introduces the danger of their partisan takeover and instrumentalization by "AD." The governmentalization of the Armed Forces deriving from the specific materialization of this change was not in the slightest rejected by any of its defenders. More than that, what was proven is that the government's predominance in the selection of military commanders, in combination with the powers which "AD" and the PS leadership want to give it in the matter of leading and managing the Armed Forces, signifies the effective liquidation of the autonomy constitutionally given to the Armed Forces.

The governmentalization of the Armed Forces, with "AD" running the government, is the open way which the government coalition has tried very hard to turn into a reactionary and pro-fascist hierarchy, of the type of Gen Soares Carneiro. Nobody can legitimately doubt that these are the proposals of "AD" and that, if it can, it would pursue them with the same sectarianism and impudence with which it has been emerging on television, in mass communications, in public enterprises, and generally in the various spheres it supervises. After the hierarchy has been placed under partisan control, "AD" would not hesitate--as its entire record in government demonstrates--in instrumentalizing the Armed Forces in the service of its own antidemocratic undertaking, aiming at the restoration of the monopolies and the big estates, seeking to restore the old forms of oppression and exploitation of the workers, restricting freedoms, and resorting to the most generalized repression.

This is exactly what Balsemao wanted to say when he proclaimed that he needed the Armed Forces as an instrument for his administration's policy.

In second place, the PCP says no to the limitation of the statute on the president of the republic, specifically, it says no to the reduction of powers with which he was elected and for which he was elected on 7 December 1980.

The fact is that the change that was approved will act as a standard in restoring the losers of 7 December 1980 in relation to the winning candidate. We know that "AD" tried to seize all political power by running Soares Carneiro as its candidate. But it lost. Now it tries to undo the defeat by depriving the president of the republic of his powers and by switching those powers to the organs of sovereignty which are under its control.

Now, the selection of military commanders is one of the most important powers with which the president of the republic was elected and for which he was elected for a period of 2 years. The loss or diminution of this authority represents an important change in the status of the president, introduced in the middle of his term, retroactively.

This change therefore is not only a disrespectful affront to the popular will expressed in the latest elections but it is also a grave violation of the democratic principle according to which the person holding a mandate based on election must not have the exercise of his mandate diminished in any way.

The governmentalization of the selection of military commanders is a serious blow to the balance, stability, and regular functioning of the institutions which, in combination with other changes, can turn into an instrument for a coup d'etat against the democratic system. If this change takes effect, the democratic forces will have to be very vigilant and will permanently have to act against its most serious consequences as far as the Armed Forces and democracy in Portugal are concerned.

Reduction of President's Powers in Relation to Government

The drastic reduction in the powers of the PR in relation to the government is another one of the serious consequences of the revision deriving from the accord between "AD" and PS/Mario Soares. Deaf to the positions assumed by democratic public opinion (including vast sectors of the PS itself), and in flagrant violation of the pledges which it assumed toward Gen Ramalho Eanes before the 1980 legislative elections, the PS leadership consummated the elimination of the current form of responsibility for government in dealing with the PR after having changed its positions on various occasions throughout the month of the revision process.

The fact is that the constitutional review draft of FRS, as well as that of "AD," purely and simply wiped out the government's responsibility in dealing with the PR.

Talking on this issue on 26 November 1981, during a meeting of the Potential Commission of Constitutional Revision, an outstanding PS spokesman said quite bluntly: "We opted in favor of eliminating the principle of dual responsibility." The same spokesman maintained that, since the power of resignation is not a characteristic power of the semi-presidential system, the PS decided to sacrifice it to the benefit of a more characteristic power: The power of free dissolution. But several months later, on 26 March, the PS leadership had a talk with the president of the republic and after that date came statements from PS leaders to the effect that they would be firmly loyal to the accord signed between the PS and Gen Eanes guaranteeing that the PS would not permit the reduction of presidential powers or the approval of a completely different way of tackling the question of dual responsibility.

Then, on 31 March, a leading member of the Permanent Commission of the PS told the press: "The PS defends the idea of dual political responsibility of the government toward the Assembly and the PR." On the following day, PORTUGAL HOJE stated: "The continuation, in the constitution, of dual responsibility of the government toward the PR and the AR [Assembly of the Republic] seems to be a fact." On 13 April, the PS secretary-general himself expressed himself in a similar manner during a

round-table discussion of the four leaders on TV, asserting: "Here, on television, long before today (he was talking about the meeting with the PR), here, I said, that I would defend the fundamental point of the semi-presidentialist content which was represented by the fact that the president of the republic could discharge the government."

Just a few days later, something entirely different came out of the accord between the "AD" and the PS which was signed during the 29 April S. Bento summit meeting.

Right now, the constitution of the republic in Article 193 provides that the government be politically responsible to the PR and to the AR. As a result of the accord between "AD" and PS/Mario Soares, the reference to the government's political responsibility to the PR has been dropped while the responsibility of the prime minister to the president of the republic is no longer termed to be political, although it still is so described in the text of the constitution, while the responsibility of the prime minister toward the AR is called "political" (Article 194), although it is not so described in the text of the constitution at this time.

We can therefore with good reason ask ourselves what the content of the government's responsibility toward the PR is supposed to be, what its characteristic features are. In briefing the Potential Commission for Constitutional Revision on the combination arrived at between the PS and "AD" for the new version of Article 193, PS leader Almeida Santos said this in connection with the elimination of the adverb "politically": "We accept the withdrawal in a group of solutions which has its own equilibrium." And he added: "When it comes to the political organization of the state, there is no other responsibility that would not be political." But the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] then through Luis Beiroco replied: "The logic of this proposal is that a distinction is drawn between political and institutional responsibility"; to which Almeida Santos retorted: "Everybody has his own interpretation."

The debates in the full assembly did not change this situation in spite of the firm demand for clarification made by the PCP. The AR in the end voted for a change in relation to which the negotiators who worked out the agreement between the "AD" and PS claim that they did not arrive at an understanding, interpreting it in a different form. It is not a coincidence that "AD" shouted victory when this solution was arrived at! It goes along with the new version of Article 198, paragraph 2, and with the clarification resulting from subparagraph (c) in Article 204.

The first change practically reduces to nothing the president's power to discharge the government; this action is allowed only under conditions of an institutional crisis and it depends on the publication of a ruling from a council of state whose composition is largely in favor of "AD" and heavily against the current PR. With the new version of subparagraph (c), Article 204, the president of the republic supposedly does not even have a moderating power over the government since it is only up to the prime minister to keep the PR informed on matters involving the country's domestic and foreign policies.

All of these changes represent a serious step toward the governmentalization of the system, creating a really anomalous status in which the government no longer has to have the confidence of the PR and where it can continue in power so long as it still has the confidence of the AR. In consistently opposing the adulteration of the semi-presidentialist content of the system, the PCP underscored two essential issues.

First of all, the arrangement worked out between "AD" and PS for the system of government is aimed at the direct expropriation of the fundamental powers of the PR and looks dangerous if it is carried out through a trick in terminology which would only enhance its spiteful character for the person involved, that is, Gen Ramalho Eanes.

In second place, to prevent a concentration of powers in the sovereign body represented by the office of the president of the republic, the government, as a body of sovereignty, is given a special status which enables it to work against the country's generalized opposition and even against a majority of the AR, provided it is not an absolute majority. This solution is particularly serious when the government is held by forces which are engaged in a big operation against the democratic system and which do not hesitate to use the amendment in the government's status to try to keep themselves in power indefinitely, shoring up their interests more and more with each passing day. This is also a serious solution because, in general, the elimination of constitutional ways to challenge the various administrations will not be beneficial to democracy but will instead only add to the dangers arising against it.

In refusing to uphold--without sophisms and with its full effectiveness--the principle of dual responsibility, the PS leadership promoted the realization of one of the most dangerous objectives of the subversive plan advanced by "AD."

A Court which Does Not Defend the Constitution

The reduction of the powers of the PR and the strengthening of bodies of sovereignty controlled by "AD" is now followed by the substitution of CR in terms of its mission of judging the unconstitutionality of laws through a court under the AR and the dominant influence of the "AD" majority on it.

The PS leaders--whose constitutional review draft gave the PR the power to appoint the judges of the future Constitutional Court--did not hesitate to drop their original proposals, completely removing the president of the republic from the process of making up this critical body and safeguarding the constitutionality of legislative activities (and, therefore, in protecting the effectiveness and implementation of the constitution).

This surrender has tremendous implications which are projected upon the general content of the constitutional amendment. The fact is that the fundamental proposals of "AD" on the matter of the economic constitution were rejected and the changes effectively introduced go far beyond the destruction and complete reversal of the direction claimed by the "AD" in the beginning. Here we even have the constitutionalization of the rights of the workers today provided for in regular legislation which "AD" violates daily and seeks to revoke.

It is however not possible to say--as the PS leaders have been doing--that the constitutional amendment "does not touch the economic organization" and that "nationalizations will be perfectly well defended." The changes introduced in the matter of organizing political power lead to a weakening of the structures and mechanisms for the defense and application of the constitution which in its entirety can be threatened and challenged by this constitutional amendment.

This was even confirmed by the announcement by Freitas do Amaral to the effect that "as of now, the important thing is to dismantle the collectivist economic system created in 1975, to liberalize the economy and the production machinery, and to open it up to competition," with the subsequent closing of "nationalized enterprises which do not show a profit." This is the plan for the restoration of the monopolies, pure and simple.

Period of Transition and New Battles in Defense of Constitution

In approving--in the full AR--the accords it entered into with "AD"--in spite of the opposition of the popular mass movement and the condemnation of these agreements within the PS and among many democratic personalities and military sectors loyal to 25 April--the PS leadership assumes an extremely serious responsibility.

This responsibility is further increased by the fact that the PS leaders accepted the demands of the "AD" in terms of the elimination of the CR before the entry into operation of the bodies that are to replace it, thus causing a new, unlawful and dangerous "period of transition."

The fact is that the PS accepted the idea that the constitutional revision law take effect on the 30th day after its publication, thus causing the elimination of the CR right away, although the laws on which the replacing bodies would have to be established have not yet been drafted. This break in continuity was expressly demanded and imposed by "AD" with the most serious political consequences.

During this period of time, whose duration may be indefinite:

There will be no successful abstract control over constitutionality and preventive control has been wiped out. The PR as a matter of fact can veto, on grounds of unconstitutionality, but the AR can always force the passage of laws if it approves them by a qualified majority;

"The authority of the CR in the matter of military administration "cannot be exercised by any other body" (legislative authority being transferred to the AR on this matter). This solution, if carried out in its precise terms, would signify the paralysis of military administration during such a long period of time that there would be a risk of the unlawful exercise of military administrative authority (specifically, by the government). The "suspension" of military administration would also have repercussions on the process of drafting the laws concerning the organization of national defense, the general foundations of the organization and operation of the Armed Forces, and the organization and process of the Constitutional Court;

The AR as a matter of fact would quickly have to draft these three constitutional revision laws, debating them and approving them by the 30th day after publication. The laws would be promulgated or vetoed during a period of 15 days as of the date of reception by the PR. If he should veto them, the AR would take the laws up again within a period of 5 days and in that case the PR could not refuse promulgation (to be accomplished within 5 days after receipt of the laws) if the AR were to pass them by a two-thirds majority.

In entering into the accord on the temporary provisions, the PS not only, in favor of "AD" mortgaged the process of drafting the laws for the development of the constitutional revision but also agreed to transform the entry into force of the constitutional revision into a break in continuity capable of opening up extremely dangerous gaps in the democratic constitutional system. On top of that, with this unconditional surrender to the demand of "AD" the "claim" which the PS is making regarding the dissolution of the AR after the revision, is reduced to its demagogic dimension since it clashes with the pledge which it assumed to the effect that it would within a certain period of time vote with the "AD" on the constitutional revision development laws.

If the revision resulting from the agreement between "AD" and PS is carried out in practice, the constitutional guarantees of Portuguese democracy would be seriously weakened while the reactionary forces would win new positions and new means for attacking it.

In the face of these dangers and these threats, it is urgent to continue the struggle with even greater victory, the struggle in defense of the democratic system, of the gains of the revolution and of 25 April itself.

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GUERRA DAMPENS EXPECTATIONS OF SWEEPING CHANGE WITH PSOE VICTORY

Madrid YA in Spanish 28 Aug 82 pp 20-21

[Interview with Alfonso Guerra by Cristina Garcia Ramos in his congressional office; date not specified]

[Text] Alfonso Guerra, the indisputable number two man in the political party whose ambition today is to guide Spain's political destiny, is a multifaceted individual who is hard to categorize, in spite of his image as the PSOE's [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] "enfant terrible," an image that he usually conveys in his public speeches. Our colleague Cristina Garcia Ramos has succeeded in this interview in showing the lesser known face of this professional politician, the human facet of a major figure who, ever since Spain began to live under a democracy, has always been a household name and at the moment has a very good chance to ride the very crest of the wave. For this reason we had to ascertain his opinion regarding developments that will surely be decisive to his political and personal career: the dissolution of the Cortes and the upcoming general elections.

"The government president's decision was no surprise at all," he told us at one of the few points yesterday afternoon when the telephones stopped ringing. "Back in January I had stated that the government wouldn't last through the next session, although I said at the time and I am repeating now that it would have been preferable for it to complete its term. What happened merely confirmed the weakness of the UCD [Democratic Center Union] administration, and is a logical consequence of it, because if the two houses had held sessions again in September, it would have lost another 20 or 25 deputies, which would be a far from edifying spectacle. The most regrettable thing about the current situation," he went on to say, "is that the people in the Balearic Islands, Castile, Leon, Extremadura

and Madrid are, for the moment, going to be without their autonomy statutes; they are going to be cut off from the autonomy process by the very weakness of the administration."

It was also inevitable that we would talk about elections, candidates and lists, now that a short campaign has begun that will conclude on 28 October, when we Spaniards will once again go to the polls. "In light of the possible Socialist victory," Alfonso Guerra said in this regard, "we would like to have the PSOE consider it as not just its own personal triumph but also to acknowledge the active involvement of many groups and individuals in a process guided, though not monopolized by the party. Hence, although we have given no thought to an election coalition, we would welcome anyone who would like to join our program and contribute their political or technical skills to the change that the PSOE wants to bring about in this country."

With respect to the drafting of the lists, he asserted that this was a complicated process starting with the party's local and provincial assemblies and that the inclusion of independents hinged more on decisions or proposals by the rank-and-file than on decisions by the party's top echelon. "There have always been independents on our lists," the PSOE vice president concluded, "and certainly this time they will have a greater presence, but we take it for granted that the basic components on all the lists will be members of our party."

Cristina Garcia Ramos's interview with Guerra went like this:

Remarks aimed at his political enemies like poisoned darts have given Alfonso Guerra the reputation of an "enfant terrible." He is the politician who has profited the most from well-chosen adjectives, and he knows it. His speeches always contain a front-page headline remark. His opinions of people and things appear in boldface and in inserts and are copied down.

[Question] Let's talk about your predictions. You have said that the Socialist Party would be in power by late 1982. Do you take this for granted now?

[Answer] Practically.

[Question] So in your opinion there have been enough years in the opposition now?

[Answer] I think so. I don't know whether we've distinguished ourselves enough to govern this country, but I do know that the mistakes of others have created a desire for change in most Spaniards, and many people identify change with the Socialist Party. This gives us a responsibility that we cannot shirk under any circumstances.

[Question] People say that the PSOE has often propped up the administration out of a desire not to burn out during trying times. Have such times passed?

[Answer] I think that getting burned out in an attempt to transform a situation that is troublesome for many Spaniards is worthwhile, but we are not going to burn out. A party like ours is a sort of Guadiana [a river that goes underground and then reemerges] that can disappear at one point and then turn up again. It wouldn't matter to me if by trying to straighten out what is happening in this country, our party lost members or got burned out as an instrument.

(Alfonso Guerra was speaking energetically and persuasively. Using gestures freely, he was extraordinarily expressive. Like his opponent Manuel Fraga, he has gotten a reputation for fierceness. These two politicians, different and distant, as the president would say, do have something in common, in my opinion: they both like to call a spade a spade, and they say what they have to say, no matter who gets hurt.)

[Question] Describe a socialist Spain to me.

[Answer] We should not confuse what we might call a socialist Spain with a Spain with a socialist government. These are two very different things. We're not crazy, nor do we want to make a circus out of politics. The fact is that in the short term and I would even say in the medium term we have a situation in which we can't perform a juggling act. We can't take away one Spain and replace it with another. So we can't talk about a socialist Spain, just a Spain with a socialist government, and in essence it will be practically the same Spain, but with some modernizations that should have been introduced many years ago but that weren't for various reasons. One of them was that Spain didn't have what is historically called a bourgeoisie, an enterprising, risk-taking bourgeoisie that could change things by letting go of some of its privileges. Because of its absence the social problem took deep root here, which is why we're in this deplorable situation. In the meantime, the people have proceeded at their own pace. I am convinced that the Spanish people have had very bad luck over the past 200 years. The elite, the ruling class, has, as a whole, not been equal to the occasion, and so our objectives as a Socialist administration in 1982-83 would be to modernize the country, which is something that the Right ought to have done but couldn't or didn't want to, and therefore it's up to us to do so.

[Question] To what are you referring when you say modernization?

[Answer] Well, freedoms, social issues, customs. We want people to feel really free, to not feel oppressed at all. In addition, we want to eliminate once and for all the discredit in which government is held. People in Spain don't believe in government because they've gotten burned. We have to give government a good reputation again and bring back honesty in office, by serving the interests of society, not individual interests. All of this will lead us to make countless reforms, but I think that people want them. The Socialist Party will carry them out if it has the opportunity to govern for 4 or 8 years.

[Question] Alfonso Guerra works 20 hours a day with a view towards that opportunity. I'm told that you retire at 4 and get up at 7. You know that you're a controversial person. In analyzing the PSOE deputy secretary, image experts say that your positive traits are that you are aggressive, reliable, intelligent, loyal to Felipe Gonzalez and an imaginative strategist. On the negative side they say you are melodramatic, menacing-looking, bad-mannered and scheming.

[Answer] I might not look good but I don't consider myself menacing-looking. The bad manners claim must be because I don't kiss ladies' hands. That's a rightwing custom that doesn't make the least sense to me.

[Question] But are you really aware that your public image doesn't help you much?

[Answer] People are fanatically for or totally against me. They are never indifferent.

[Question] If all the good and bad things said about you could be summed up in two words, I think that the Spanish people would say that Guerra is a born organizer, a man who is absolutely indispensable in the PSOE. At the same time they would criticize your lack of prudence. It is said that every time you give a speech, the party loses votes because what you say, or more precisely, how you say it, bothers a lot of people who, in contrast, accept the way Felipe Gonzalez does and says things.

[Answer] Let's go point by point. I have to agree with what people say about my being a great organizer, and I'm not at all shy about saying this. I lock myself up for hours and hours working in my office, and this combines with my passion for mathematical logic, which I apply.

As far as this business of the two faces, Felipe's and mine, is concerned, this is something that people have invented, probably without ever thinking about it, and I have to admit that they've done us a big favor. When Felipe and I read that we are at odds, that there are great tensions between us, we laugh, because the fact is that we get along perfectly. We think so much alike that at times we don't even have to talk to each other; we agree on everything.

[Question] From what you are saying, it seems that this is all part of the party's strategy, though I wouldn't say that it's premeditated.

[Answer] It really is a good strategy. The PSOE is picking up the unattached right- and leftwing vote now. This has come about spontaneously; we are taking advantage of success, as one would say in military jargon. Felipe has one personality, and I have another. Of course we never say: Now I'm going to address these people and you the others. No, but when Felipe and I say the same things, they are received differently.

[Question] Yes, but this is confusing sometimes. Many people would like to know what the "PSOE's real tone of voice is," whether it's Felipe's or yours.

[Answer] I'll say it again: we agree on everything, and the only difference is that we present different images. This is extraordinarily positive for the party. I have studied election campaigns a great deal ever since the Franco era; I even set up a corporation to study markets and campaign strategies. I know this subject well, and all over the world I've been told that it is an extraordinary asset to be able to offer an image like ours, a party that presents different sides of the same face. Believe me, no party could ever dream of a better image.

[Question] Speaking of the early days of the PSOE in the underground, you were the man who overhauled the party in Andalusia from within and brought Felipe Gonzalez in. So why did Alfonso Guerra become number two and Felipe Gonzalez number one?

[Answer] He's a much more valuable man than I am.

[Question] Are you sure that there's no story behind that simple statement?

[Answer] There's nothing to hide. I said this completely in earnest. Felipe is a man with a fantastic imagination. Felipe creates politics instead of reacting to it. In contrast, I can react to politics and I might do so better or worse, but I react in a studied way to a situation. Felipe is a creator, a marvelous inventor and has responses and solutions to all situations. For this reason and because he is extraordinarily good-natured in dealing with people, he was the logical choice to head our party, not me, and this is something that no one disputes. No one has ever wondered or ever will wonder whether it should be Felipe or Alfonso Guerra. It's Felipe.

[Question] So then, where do your ambitions lie in the event that the PSOE wins the general elections? Would you become government vice president, continue as president of the parliamentary group or take over the Culture Ministry, which is supposed to hold a special attraction for you? What are you going to do?

[Answer] If I could choose, I wouldn't join the administration, but if I had to and I could choose, I would, in fact, choose the Culture Ministry, but I don't think that I'll have too much of a say in any of these decisions.

(He sipped his coffee slowly, adding just a drop of milk; it must have been his second cup that morning. Putting his hands together, forefinger against forefinger, thumb against thumb and the rest interlocked, he continued his reply in a restrained voice (How different from the Guerra at the podium in Congress!). Our conversation has by this time become more informal. Without drifting from political issues, it focuses more on Alfonso Guerra the person.)

[Answer continued] I was saying that at this point it is not going to be up to me, because I feel that I have a moral commitment to people and to events, a commitment that becomes harder to break every day, even though I'm involved in politics without politics being my calling. I've tried to leave it on three occasions. I made three serious attempts, in 1974, 1976 and 1979, but I couldn't do it. I've been on the verge, but I couldn't do it. The fact is (he pauses, looks at the papers in front of him and then glances at his office walls) that I don't want to be in politics forever. Sometimes I have fun (his face lights up; his gestures quicken). It's as if I were watching a game of chess between a player who knows what he's doing and one who's in a fog. I have fun playing hide-and-seek with some people on the Right who don't understand anything about politics. But the fact is (his gestures become calm again) that politics is not my natural activity. I would like to devote myself to teaching, to culture, but I see this as far-off right now. I will remain in politics and do what I'm told.

[Question] It's unlikely that anyone will tell you to take a teaching job in a rural school or suggest that you conduct an orchestra. These were callings that got left behind.

[Answer] Conducting an orchestra was a childhood passion. At night, when all my brothers and sisters went to bed (my family had 13 children), I stayed up listening to a Lisbon radio station called Radio Miramar, which had a stupendous classical music program, grabbed a baton and started conducting. At the age of nine I spent many early morning hours conducting orchestras.

I've been just partially frustrated as a teacher. I was never a rural schoolteacher but I was a professor. For years I gave classes at the School of Technical Architects in Seville and I've also taught at the Universidad Laboral, and I've given thousands upon thousands of lectures and short courses in my life. I threw myself into poetry and theater.

[Question] And how did politics enter Alfonso Guerra's life?

[Answer] Many people think that it's like magic, that one day they tap you on the shoulder with a magic wand and say "come over here and

become a politician." It's not like that, or at least it wasn't like that in my case. I came to the Socialist Party the way you come to everything in this life: through a series of happenstances. I had concerns, like all of the students in the university at the time, but my concerns were above all literary and artistic. I came up against a terrible administration that told me that I could only perform the Alvarez Quintero brothers on the stage. I wanted to do other things. So I began to take issue with the administration for purely esthetic reasons. Around that time I discovered a short work by Machado, my great literary passion, a very short work, just two pages, in which he tells of the day when as a child they took him to a meeting with Pablo Iglesias, and he said that he recalled that Pablo Iglesias's voice had the unmistakable timbre of human truth. That had a profound effect on me. I began to investigate who Pablo Iglesias was and looking around a used bookstore, clandestinely, I came across a book by Juan Jose Morato that talked about the socialist worker leaders. That was the starting point. Afterwards, along with other colleagues, I devoted myself to organizing the Socialist Youth. The first wager, the first challenge was to change things from within, without leaving Spain. Other socialists took off because they didn't think that this was possible, but it was, and many of those who left have returned.

(This marked the start of his political career. Our conversation began with talk of the home stretch that, if Alfonso Guerra's predictions come true, will mark the finish line for him.)

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FRAGA RULES OUT COALITION GOVERNMENT WITH PSOE

Madrid YA in Spanish 27 Aug 82 pp 22-23

[Interview with Popular Alliance (AP) leader Manuel Fraga in his summer house in Perbes, Galicia by Pilar Llorente; date not specified]

[Text] When you get to Perbes, you find out that all of the residents know perfectly well where Manuel Fraga lives. His summer home is very close to the beach, to which he has direct access from his large and well-manicured garden. "La Dorna" is the result of 20 years of improvements and continuous care, and it has turned out to be a cozy, peaceful place surrounded with walls. We were able to speak with Fraga just after he had gotten out of a refreshing bath. He showed us around his home, filled with hunting trophies and decorated tastefully.

The leader of AP was in a very fine mood; he had just returned from Colombia, where he had attended President Betancur's inauguration. He will be here in Perbes until 8 or 9 September but will slip away to Madrid on 1 September.

Contacts in Colombia

[Question] My first question has to do with the impressions you got on your trip and with any contacts you made with other Spanish politicians who were also there.

[Answer] The fact is that, as is to be expected, we didn't go there to talk with each other but rather to be present at President Betancur's inauguration, while each of us made the contacts that seemed proper. So, Felipe Gonzalez had contacts in Venezuela rather than Colombia; he met with AD [Democratic Action] groups. The president was on an official mission, and I met particularly with Colombia's conservatives, whose party is very similar to Popular Alliance.

We were together at official receptions, and I spoke almost exclusively about foreign policy with them. I discussed issues relating to Spanish emigration with the government president and the foreign minister. I also discussed foreign policy with Felipe Gonzalez, as we spoke hardly at all about domestic affairs. However, I did take the opportunity to reaffirm my opposition to early elections, because I think that at this point it would be inviting confusion and voter abstention.

Latin America

[Question] How important do you think Spain's relations with Latin America are?

[Answer] They are of the utmost importance. We can't fool ourselves. Our history is there, our culture is there, and our future is there too. I met, for example, with two newsmen from EL TIEMPO, and they know as much about Spanish politics as we do and, of course, much more than we know about Colombian politics.

This is not the case in other countries. I could say that I met there with Spaniards, especially Galicians, who live lives that are very different from the ones they live in other countries, where they are true emigrants. It's different there, because the opportunities are enormous if we make a serious effort. I have always said this, because I have experienced it, being the son of emigrants and having worked in the Institute of Hispanic Culture for many years. This meeting of various party leaders would not have been possible a few years ago in any Latin American country, and now it is.

[Question] How does Latin America view Spain's entry into NATO?

[Answer] At the moment with some degree of suspicion, which would not have been the case before the Malvinas conflict. The serious mistake that Washington and the NATO countries made in this regard has obviously created some distrust, but we have to remember that NATO does not impose any sort of obligation on us south of the Tropic of Cancer. Therefore, this is just a psychological problem. We really won't have any obligations there, and once we are active members, we (and I'm talking here as a political force) are not going to let Spain stand by and watch mistakes made, like the ones that were committed during the Malvinas conflict.

A Time of Rest

[Question] Can Spaniards enjoy a peaceful rest on their vacations this year?

[Answer] The Spanish custom of going off for a rest, to get ready for autumn, is absolutely correct, I think. They've taken off with less money and more worries, but they've taken off. What I must state is that Spain today has no problem, I repeat, no problem that cannot be resolved as long as all Spaniards take their country seriously.

In this regard, in addition to resting, they have to get ready to work, and this work entails further work. There are a great many Spaniards who are willing to collect from the State but not to contribute to it; there are a great many of them. Right now we have to work as citizens. We have to say: I'll pay my share as a citizen and be concerned about my country's affairs; that's exactly why we have a democracy. And today no one can claim that other people are responsible. The 55 percent of the Spanish electorate who stayed at home in recent elections have to stop that. They have to change their minds and say: let's get to work.

Unemployment

[Question] At the moment there are many unemployed persons who cannot find work, no matter how hard they try.

[Answer] I would have to say that that is both true and false. In other words, Spain's economy is not, in fact, working well today, but there are many job openings with no one to fill them. Right now many Spaniards want comfortable jobs. We have to admit that there are many employers looking for workers, who say to them: Hey, I'm unemployed and don't want to work. I'm not saying that this is the rule. What I'm saying is that many more people could be working than actually are.

[Question] Unemployment, autonomies, eradicating terrorism, economic crisis. What do you think are the key points involved in solving these problems?

[Answer] Obviously there are a lot of problems, and we have to try and prevent the trees from blocking our view of the forest, as the saying goes. We have to establish priorities. In my view, the first priority is to put an end to the era of facile hopes, the era of "I can and do promise," which has turned out to be a regrettable expression, and as I said, we all have to start working. We have to call a spade a spade and face up to the facts. Secondly, we have to reform the constitution. Some people saying: "Mr Fraga wants to amend the constitution, which means that we have to undo what we have achieved." No sir, quite the opposite. What I want is for it to work.

If the constitution were working, we wouldn't have to amend it. In my judgment, there are two urgent issues: the system of parties and the electoral law. This is a bad law, and to say that it is working just fine is a lie. We're going to see what has to be straightened out, and first of all we need clear-cut majorities. The minority governments that we have had have been a disaster. Coalition governments wouldn't be much better, and we also need a consistent, responsible party system. There are a lot of parties today because every fellow who doesn't get what he wants in his party goes off and starts another one, as my dear friend Suarez has just done. I'm not saying that you have to be born and live your whole life as a conservative, liberal or socialist, but a minimum of consistency is necessary. That's a fact, but I don't want

to bring this down to a personal level. Therefore, that's where we would have to begin, by organizing a serious party system, a government that works, an opposition that works, and this is the opposite of what people are saying about this radicalizing the country. Look, countries have to govern themselves and to resolve their problems they have to radicalize a bit too. They have to take themselves seriously.

The problem is that here no one resolves anything, no one picks a quarrel with anyone; we all agree not to bring up problems, and this is why we are in the shape we are now: weighed down with problems and people without jobs. So, I've given you the order of priorities: first, organize the government, and then the government will take care of the rest.

Terrorism

[Question] Would this also resolve the problem of terrorism?

[Answer] How can you doubt that? There are terrorists all over the world, but some countries put them in jail, and others allow them to operate. This is the difference between a country that is governed and one that is not.

[Question] So the problem of terrorism is just a problem of government?

[Answer] I've said that a hundred times already. People were shocked when I said that the only good terrorist was a dead or imprisoned terrorist, and I'll say it again.

The Natural Majority

[Question] Would you ever form an alliance with Suarez and his new CDS [Democratic and Social Center]?

[Answer] You would have to ask him that question, because he's the one who just left his own party. The natural majority is a doctrine that simply says that there are two models of society: one that attaches a greater value to morals, tradition and private property, and another that sets greater store by a bureaucracy to solve our problems for us and that advocates an approach based on the public sector. We have to choose between the two, but today there are many people who instead of choosing go around scheming for a job and don't care about the underlying issues, and you can't make pacts with people like that.

In any event, we are open-minded and willing to make a pact with anyone. But Suarez has already said no, that he would sooner come to terms with the Socialists. Well, may God reward or bless him.

No Coalition Government

[Question] If the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] and AP together get a majority of the votes at the upcoming elections, would it be hard for these parties to reach an agreement to govern?

[Answer] The normal procedure, because we have to take things as they are, is for democracy to be competitive, and, therefore, cooperation is basic in defending the system, but then there is a government and an opposition. Therefore, we must not call for anything else, because we would be returning to the former system and resurrecting the national movement. The rule is that the two political groups, each defending its model for society and within a parliamentary democracy enshrined in the constitution, acknowledge whomever wins the majority. Therefore, I am not in favor of a coalition government. Nothing of the sort, just a government and the opposition.

Santiago and Coruna

[Question] What do you think of the problem created in La Coruna by transferring the capital to Santiago?

[Answer] The capital has not been transferred. This is not true. The province capital is still La Coruna, and the pertinent institutions will remain there. What happened was that a new seat of home rule institutions was set up. The autonomy capital was never La Coruna, and when the statute was passed, everyone knew that it said that the capital would be decided by a two-thirds vote, and only Santiago could get that.

That was how the capital site was decided, and I think that serious damage has been done, and the people who were involved in it were from parties that had agreed in advance that it would be Santiago. This is what the Socialist Party and, ultimately, what UCD did.

Gibraltar, Ceuta, Melilla and the Canaries

[Question] Will the Gibraltar problem ever be resolved?

[Answer] As I said in a recent article of mine, this is a specific gauge of Spain's overall progress. The military, economic and cultural gap between Spain and England today is much smaller than when this extremely serious anomaly arose, and if Spain continues to work hard and to create sound political and military institutions, we will see this issue resolved very soon.

[Question] Are you worried right now about the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla?

[Answer] The Canary Islands do not worry me at all. They are the most Spanish territory that Spain has, and by their own decision. Therefore, I'm not worried about the Canary Islands, which does not mean that I do not acknowledge the special obligation that all of Spain has to them. Ceuta and Melilla are another problem, because unfortunately Morocco has a permanent grievance relating to them, but of course this is a second gauge of Spain. As long as Spain is Spain, Ceuta and Melilla will be Spanish.

[Question] We're coming to the close of this interview, and I have to bring up the future elections again. With what kind of attitude and hopes are you approaching them?

[Answer] With great hopes, because I am one of those who believe in the Spanish people.

Manuel Fraga takes advantage of his vacation time to visit all of the towns in Galicia, a custom that he has observed for years.

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POLITICAL

TURKEY

TCP TRIAL CONTINUES WITH CALL FOR PRISONER RELEASE

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 23 Aug 82 p 12

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET BUREAU)--Defense attorneys in the TCP [Turkish Communist Party] trial said they were bewildered by the court's release ruling.

On 20 August defense attorneys Metin Sekercioglu and Muzaffer Ozbayrak presented a petition to the court during the trial, being held at the Ankara Martial Law Command Second Military Court. The other defense attorneys also expressed their complete agreement with Sekercioglu and Ozbayrek's views. The views contained in the petition in which all defense attorneys concurred are in part:

"We have stated in previous petitions and submissions that we are dealing with a trial in which suit has been brought against hundreds of people for the crime of thought in violation of the fundamental principles of the law, the Constitution and human rights (because these people are being tried for the crime of thought). We have also declared in these statements that the preliminary questioning documents were arranged by methods having no legal basis.

"Our view, summarized above, was also held by the judges at the stage prior to the opening of trial as revealed in the release of certain defendants whose detention had been requested.

"Despite all this lack of foundation, it is our duty to defend suspects in a trial brought against them by the distinguished prosecutor under article 141 of the Turkish Penal Code.

"In this trial, as in all trials, the traditional hearings for the release of defendants under detention were proceeded with and, though we found it unusual, we did not object.

"As questioning progressed, the thought vis-a-vis the being kept in detention of some of our clients who should have been released that an assessment might be made as the result of future questioning of other defendants concerning each defendant led us to wait patiently.

"Vis-a-vis the impression created by our most distinguished court as to the possible release of the defendants as the result of a general assessment to be made following the completion of all questioning and the warnings to the effect that delay in completion of the questioning might be reason for extension of the detention status of many defendants yet to be released, we awaited the outcome of the general assessment.

"As the defense, an essential element of trial, we were bewildered by the release ruling delivered at the conclusion of the general evaluation. The cause of this bewilderment is rooted, not in the meagerness of the number of defendants released alone, but also in the failure to identify the standards applied in the rulings for release or continued detention.

"In fact, even if we disregard the fundamental principle that thought does not constitute a crime, we are alarmed and at a loss to find any measure of the physical conditions sought by the law. If we apply any set of standards to the status of those released and those remaining under detention, we reach the conclusion that all of those still under detention today should be released also. We shall not go into concrete examples and details, but we can give many examples from the case file if desired. Let us reiterate with emphasis this fact, however, that with these examples we wholeheartedly concur in all the release rulings given, because we believe that no man should be imprisoned for even one day because of his thoughts. We would like to say that those remaining in detention should also be released immediately."

After speaking of the special status of some of the defendants, the petition continues: "Even if we supposed for a moment that all our clients would be convicted, preventing the prior assumption of guilt under the circumstances expressed each day by Mamuk Prison, which you said is outside your jurisdiction, are rulings within your jurisdiction which we expect from Your Honors, the court. Imprisonment is not the penalty. Indeed, there is no penalty where our clients are concerned because there is no provision of penal law relevant to them."

8349
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MILITARY

GREECE

FRENCH U.S. FIRMS REPORTEDLY VIE FOR AIRCRAFT PURCHASE CONTRACT

Athens OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek No 32, 12 Aug 82 p 15

[Text] According to information we have received, attempts to sell to Greece French Mirage fighter planes and U.S.-made F-16 aircraft are becoming increasingly more insistent by both the French and the U.S. sides. As we have learned, representatives of the French aircraft manufacturing firm Dassault have submitted--or will do very soon--to the Greek government a new purchasing plan which includes, besides the terms of payment, also plans for the establishment in Greece of high technology aircraft manufacturing sectors.

At this point, however, we have learned that the French have argued about the problems of maintaining secrecy over their manufacturing processes. In other words, they have expressed certain concerns as to how it will be possible to avoid any leaks to third countries not in the West about some manufacturing details regarding the Mirage planes.

On the other hand, the General Dynamics and United Technologies firms, which build the engines for the F-16's are reportedly ready, as we have learned, to start receiving payment for any eventual purchases after 1986, in order to avoid causing any fiscal problems for the Greek Government.

CSO: 4621/506

MILITARY

GREECE

BRIEFS

AIR FORCE PROMOTIONS--Colonel A. Moisidhis has been promoted to major general. Lieutenant Colonels A. Naglis, Y. Karambelas and M. Sakellarious have been promoted to colonel. Majors K. Theodhorakopoulos, Dhi. Stamatopoulos, E. Zervas and Y. Liapis have been promoted to lieutenant colonel. Captains P. Bambas, A. Yeorgoudhis, E. Glimis, S. Kehayias, E. Sevvas, A. Papanastasious and Kh. Kharalambopoulos have been promoted to major. [NC072148 Athens ELEVATHEROTIPIA in Greek 7 Sep 82 p 16]

CSO: 4621/504

GENERAL

CYPRUS

BRIEFS

KIPRIANOU TO VISIT ATHENS--In press release No 1 of today due to an oversight it is stated that the president of the republic, Mr Spiros Kiprianou, will visit Athens on 14 October. Mr Kiprianou will visit Athens on 18 October.
[Text] [NC130805 Nicosia PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICE in English 10 Sep 82 p 1]

CSO: 4600/770

PRICES, PAYLOADS OF ARIANE, U.S. SHUTTLE COMPARED

Paris LE MONDE in French 9 Jun 82 p 14

[Article by M.A.]

[Text] Recently, several contracts were signed by Arianespace to launch some communications satellites by means of the European launcher even though Ariane was competing with the "throw-away" launchers of the United States or with the spaceshuttle, which is reusable. NASA took some offense at this and some somewhat biting remarks were made on that side of the Atlantic concerning the subsidy made available to Ariane by the European governments.

NASA did not play up the contents of a rather harsh report sent to the Congress by the GAO in which it was noted that the shuttle flights are far from being billed at their true cost to those who use them.

The GAO report contains some revealing figures. The cost of a launching by the space shuttle, estimated in 1976 to be \$16.1 million, was figured in September 1980 to be \$27.9 million, an increase of 73 percent in constant dollars. The cost could reach \$30.5 million by early 1983 when the shuttle begins its operational flights. (All the foregoing dollar figures are in 1975 dollars.)

In view of these figures, the price billed by NASA, established in 1976 for the first 3 years of operational service, does not exceed \$18 million.¹ The subsidy is sufficiently large. Taking into account the various price ranges, and the type of mission planned for the first 3 years, the GAO estimates that NASA will use "\$1.2 billion to finance the difference between the true costs and the reimbursements made by the users." This sum would pay for 15 Ariane launchings. The "subsidy" for the European launcher is much less; the participants in the Ariane program have only agreed to pay 25 percent more, for launchings done on their behalf, than they would have billed non-European customers.

1. This price covers 24 hours of mission for a 3-member team. For some clients a user right (use free) of \$43 million must be added.

The gross underestimation of shuttle costs has made it intrinsically less expensive for the customer than Ariane. There can be no direct comparison in terms of the cost of launching, since the shuttle can carry much heavier satellites, or many more of them, than can Ariane. On the other hand, the shuttle does not go into geosynchronous orbit, where most of the commercial satellites must be placed. These satellites must, therefore, be mounted in a "perigee stage" enabling them to be put into geosynchronous orbit after being launched from the shuttle.

Launching Requirements

The launching of a geosynchronous telecommunications satellite weighing about 1 ton is done by NASA at a cost of about \$17 million as opposed to some \$29 million if done by Ariane. This difference could have prevented Ariane from gaining the slightest foothold in the export market, but the shuttle has not yet finished its test flights--one motor exploded during a ground test on 7 April--and the shuttle's availability is not a sure thing. Customers are being offered an alternative--launching by means of a Delta rocket--but this is much more costly running to some \$35 million or so. Use of the shuttle also has other disadvantages: three or four satellites should be placed together on the rocket, meaning they must all be ready at the same time; the launch requirements of the DOD have priority, a factor that can affect civilian launches; and the location of Kourou, Guyana, contrasted with that of Cape Canaveral, the former being much nearer the equator, means that with the same launching power a satellite of 17 percent greater mass can be launched from Kourou.

It is true that if NASA were to keep its price as artificially low when the shuttle flights become fully operational, Ariane would have no future, but that appears impossible since NASA's objective is to be reimbursed within 10 years for the costs associated with its operational flights, the only development costs of the shuttle chargeable to the U.S. Government. The level of prices after the first 3 years, which is to be established this summer and then be adjusted every year thereafter, should be sufficiently high to pay off the enormous losses suffered during the first 3 years. As matters now stand, a doubling of prices appears probable.

So there is good reason to believe that the Ariane launchings will prove to be more economical. That is the belief at ArianeSpace, a belief that justifies the creation of a whole family of Ariane-4 rockets adapted to the various missions that the development of space activities calls for. One notes with interest that certain NASA officials are calling for the development of a non-reusable, or unmanned, launcher making use of certain shuttle components and be better able to compete with Ariane. This would be a sweet comeback for this "deterrent launcher" that was decided upon in 1973 mainly to provide Europe with a certain degree of independence vis-a-vis the United States but which then appeared to have no commercial future in view of the U.S. shuttle's much lower price structure.

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GENERAL

FRANCE

BRIEFS

DEEPEST DIVING SUBMARINE--The first submarine capable of diving to 6,000 meters below the surface, the SM 97, has been built at Saint-Chamond (Loire Department) by Euroform, an affiliate of Creusot-Loire. The submarine is made of two hemispheres of titanium, each 2.10 meters in diameter, and can withstand a pressure of 600 bars. Three men will be able to board this submarine which can then independently explore almost any ocean bottom in the world. It was developed by the National Center for Oceanic Exploration and the Technical Directorate for Naval Construction. [Text] [Paris LES ECHOS in French 11 Jun 82 p 6] 9974

ARIANE PRODUCTION SPEEDUP--As a result of the commercial success of the Ariane, production of this rocket will be stepped up to seven or eight per year beginning in 1985, contrasted with the rate of five per year in effect now, according to Arianespace which controls exploitation of the rocket and reported the information above in a notice published Friday. As of 15 May 1982, there were 24 definite reservations for launches (not including 11 satellites that have been or are to be launched on behalf of the European Space Agency) and 13 more reservations extending into 1986, according to Arianespace. [Text] [Paris LES ECHOS in French 21 Jun 82 p 6] 9974

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ALCOHOLISM POSES GROWING HEALTH THREAT

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 17 August 82 pp 1,7

Text As Turkish society continues to assume the outlook of a society that is increasingly disposed towards the consumption of alcohol, it has been determined that during the past year the Turkish public has consumed 64 billion liras worth of alcohol. It has also been observed that the money spent on alcoholic beverages is approaching the amount spent for non-alcoholic beverages.

According to data obtained from the Yearbook of Turkish Statistics and the Report of the Turkish Union of Chambers by a reporter from the Turkish News Agency, alcoholic beverages worth 64,941,000,000 liras and non-alcoholic beverages worth 62,750,000,000 liras were consumed in Turkey last year. Non-alcoholic beverages are being classified as cold drinks. It has also been determined that the revenue generated in Turkey by the alcoholic consumption of Turkish society is equivalent to approximately 30 percent of the total revenue generated by all economic activities not including state services. According to the figures, 6.5 percent of per capita income is being set aside for the consumption of alcoholic beverages.

The figures indicate that the Turkish public has spent 49,714,000,000 liras for raki alone and that 82,520,000 large bottles of raki were consumed last year. The consumption of raki has increased by 280 percent over the last 11 years. Raki is followed by vodka which was consumed in 1981 at a rate of 7,000,000 large bottles worth 4.5 billion liras. According to calculations, 20,900,000 bottles of wine are annually being consumed in our country at a cost of 3 billion liras. The consumption of cognac and gin stands at approximately 3 million bottles worth 2.5 billion liras.

The figures indicate that the consumption of beer has sharply increased over the last few years and stands at a per capita yearly amount of 7 liters. The yearly consumption of beer is equivalent to 2.5 million hectoliters and a cost of 3 billion liras to the public.

According to the same data, 1.5 billion liters of cola and carbonated beverages as well as 250 million bottles of fruit juice and 300 million bottles of mineral water were consumed during 1981. The Turkish public paid a total of 62,750,000,000 liras for these beverages which are being classified as cold drinks. Of this total, 45 billion liras were spent on colas and carbonated beverages while 8,000,750,000 liras were spent on fruit juice and 6 billion liras were spent for tonic water.

Manufacturers of non-alcoholic beverages are attributing the increased demand for alcoholic beverages to government policy and are particularly complaining about the encouragement given to the consumption of beer. The views of Fruko-Tamek General Director Selcuk Maruflu concerning this matter may be briefly summarized as follows: "Beer which is an alcoholic beverage is virtually being encouraged in Turkey while non-alcoholic beverages are being curtailed. Over the past few years, adolescents who used to be the primary consumers of non-alcoholic beverages have become overly familiar with beer as an alcoholic beverage. This has resulted in the emergence of an alcoholic habit among the young and has adversely influenced demand within our industry." For their part, sociologists and psychologists are attributing the increased disposition of Turkish society towards alcoholic consumption to the economic, social and political conditions of our day.

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END